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I. Introduction
Much of the land upon which the Barclays Center was built, and where several luxury
residential towers have either been built or are slated to go up, was acquired through eminent
domain. The statute of eminent domain grants the government the power to seize private
property and convert it into public use, so long as the owner is justly compensated. While the law
is concise, the judiciary has held that while the question as to whether a taking is for public use is
judicial (Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, (1930)), the judiciary’s capacity “in determining
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one” (Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). These decisions taken in conjunction have yielded a sociolegal landscape of constant-deferment, with no court willing to circumscribe the statute’s
limitations through concrete precedent. Despite the use of eminent domain to take the lands for
the Pacific Park (née Atlantic Yards1) – Barclays Center project, in a 2009 interview with Crain’s
Magazine, lead developer Bruce Ratner suggested that the project’s plans would remain private:
“Why should they get to see the plans?” he asked. “This isn’t a public project” (Agovino 2009).
Pacific Park is a redevelopment project near downtown Brooklyn, currently underway
and led by developer Forest City Ratner (FCR). The project’s original plan encompassed a
professional sports stadium, 16 high-rise mixed-use buildings, and the promised renewal of
Vanderbilt Yard, a train depot that the Metropolitan Transit Authority uses to store Long Island
Rail Road train cars in need of repair. The project was officially announced on December 10th,

The project was initially called ‘Atlantic Yards’ by the developer, Forest City Ratner (FCR).
After years of legal strife and community resistance, and following the purchase of a majority of
shares in the 14 yet-unbuilt high rises by the Chinese development company Greenland
Corporation, the project was re-dubbed ‘Pacific Park’ in an attempt to save face and rebrand. The
state still officially refers to the project as ‘Atlantic Yards’, leaving the proper nomenclature
rather elusive (Oder, 2014).
1
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2003, in a presentation targeted at then-NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg and potential investors.
The announcement centered around the acquisition of the New Jersey Nets basketball team, a
professional team in the NBA that was to be the lynchpin and anchor business for the planned
stadium (Bagli 2003). Since that 2003 announcement, the project has undergone multiple
changes, and has been the subject of legal challenges from the community who would be
displaced by the planned development.
While the Atlantic Yards site has a long and contentious history in New York City, the
recent use of eminent domain brings into conversation a variety of debates surrounding the
political economy and democratization of development. Ratner’s claim that the project is not
public conflicts with general notions about the meaning and role of the public (and its corollary,
the public good), in the language and politics of development. But beyond the popular
imagination of development, the project has evoked deeper reflections on the direction of urban
planning in New York. In so doing, a diverse array of spatial imaginaries – simultaneous,
overlapping, fluid, and conflicting – about what the ideal city or neighborhood looks like have
been sublimated out of the project and its resistances. The legal, spatial, and economic
entanglements connecting local development to socio-political power have captured a snapshot
of those imaginaries through the documents produced in support of, and in opposition to, the
project.
Struggles over the power to define the public, in this instance, are given a forum through
the usage of eminent domain and the ensuing socio-legal battle. In the case of the Atlantic Yards
– Barclays Center project, a diverse set of stakeholders surfaced in the struggle over that
definition. Understanding those stakeholders and interpreting clearly their divergent
conceptualizations of neighborhood, community, and public good is instructive for
2

understanding the process of development, its struggles, and its impacts on social, economic,
political, and physical space. Furthermore, in the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center case, eminent
domain plays a considerable role in the negotiation of public identity, as it simultaneously
empowers certain types of land-use change while also opening avenues of legalistic recourse for
the communities being subjected to development.
As the eminent domain ruling began to take the spotlight in the public conversation of
how the project site should be developed, the visions for the site held by stakeholders on all sides
were captured in various media, legalistic artifacts, artworks, and community dialogues. In order
to understand the relationship connecting eminent domain and notions of the public good to
development paradigms and power-relations in New York City, this thesis interprets and
deconstructs those textual artifacts as embodied spatial imaginaries. Representations not just of
the project site, but of possible places and places of possibility that occupy the site’s footprint,
were enunciated through the ensuing legal battle.
What happened (and continues to happen) around the development site near downtown
Brooklyn is instructive. The use of eminent domain, the challenges against that use, and the
organization of resident stakeholders in opposition to the stakeholders underwriting and driving
the development process, produced a rich library of textual artifacts across diverse media.
Deconstructing and analyzing these documents points to conceptualizations of place and scale,
filtered through and attuned to legal norms and systems, that confounds popular notions of scale
in the broader community development conversation. Different stakeholders exercised the power
to define the public and the public good differently, according to their spatial and scalar
imaginations. Supporting the theorization in geographic work that destabilizes traditional
hierarchical conceptualizations of space and scale (e.g., Marsten 2000), the distance between
3

actors’ scalar imaginations and the ramifications of their actions are often messy and
incongruous. In the eminent domain proceedings challenging the Pacific Park project, resident
activists – who strategically deploy a ‘local’ conception of scale to achieve their political goals –
confront constellations of city, state, national, and international power. Likewise, the developers
and their allies, across a variety of jurisdictions including national lines, are enabled by the
combinatorial power of politics and finance to impose change on a small swath of land in
Brooklyn.
These spatial imaginaries are embodied in the artifacts produced through eminent domain
proceedings, and point to a rift between the ways in which the various players deploy scale
(usually along traditional scalar hierarchies), and the felt impact at the site of development
(which defies those traditional hierarchies and begs for another explanation). That different
stakeholders’ spatial imaginaries, when considered in the context of their actions and outcomes,
confound hierarchical conceptions of scale, scratches against a basic problem in the framing of
eminent domain. In contemporary geographic thought, eminent domain is usually described as
just one of many legal and political powers deployed by the state to push the city along certain
axes of development.
A new need surfaces, then, to (re)conceptualize eminent domain; to interpret it as not
just a legal statute but as an intervention that reveals complex entanglements in the built
environment. Through the deconstruction of textual artifacts produced during legal challenges to
the eminent domain taking in the Pacific Park Case, this thesis argues that eminent domain
should be reimagined as a socio-legal process characterized by its tendency to transcend and
transmute scalar imaginaries. If not through the statute’s deployment, then through the debates
that arise during legal challenges, eminent domain relays the power to produce change in the
4

built environment in ways that resist traditional hierarchical theorizations on scale. The statute,
in this sense, constitutes a forum in which stakeholders on either side of a dispute may influence
the built environment through means that confound even those actors’ own scalar imaginations
of community, self, and power.
Of considerable importance to the reframing of eminent domain as process is the notion
that both law and space are mutually constitutive. As Antonio Azuela and Rodrigo MenesesReyes suggest, the law “serves as a means to produce and reproduce an imaginary spatial
cohesion in an urban space of conflicting values and expectations” (2014). But the law, in
providing mechanisms for ordering contested imaginaries into a “particular reality” (Blomley
2003, 29), does more than determine which imaginary is realized, and which are dismissed. As
made clear in the outcomes stemming thus far from the Atlantic Yards eminent domain ruling,
law simultaneously provided the mechanisms for the transferrance of land essential to the
project’s construction, whilst constituting legitimate avenues for the project’s opponents to
disrupt the development process. David Delaney’s concept of the ‘nomosphere’ (2010) – a
framework for binding the spatial and the legal that elevates the dynamic co-productive nature of
their relationship – is instructive in the proceeding line of inquiry. Today’s downtown Brooklyn
– which resembles neither the developers’ nor the opposing residents’ exact imaginaries – attests
to the combinatorial characteristics of how law orders space.
What becomes necessary, then, is a synthesis of postmodern critical legal frameworks
that allows for multiple legalities of space (von Benda-Beekman et al. 2014) and grapples with
the intertwinements between those legalities and contemporary geographical work on scale. Such
a framework allows for a holistic reading of the Atlantic Yards project and its struggles that
accounts for the multiple socio-spatial and socio-legal imaginaries represented amongst the
5

various actors in the debate. Furthermore, such an analytical framework takes into account the
ways in which the deployment of eminent domain resists conventional hierarchical
conceptualizations of scale as an attribute of contemporary urban life. In view of the notion that
the cost of private property’s autonomy and propriety is some degree of public responsibility
(Blomley 2005), a focus on the public use clause of the eminent domain taking acquires unique
significance for understanding the project and its struggles. A geographic interrogation of
eminent domain, then, is long overdue.
This thesis’ second chapter brings into dialogue the various theories that guide the
ensuing analysis. Critical legal geography and feminist urban geography in combination provide
much of the backbone for this analysis. Nomosphericity is given particular attention, in that the
concept’s openness allows for different theorizations for different actors. The residents’ work in
challenging the eminent domain taking for the Pacific Park project demands a different
theorization than, for example, the logical underpinnings driving the project’s developers and
financiers. The nomosphere allows for these different theories to exist in contact with one
another, while simultaneously centering the intertwinements of legality and spatiality.
In the third chapter, I discuss eminent domain as it is popularly conceived. Clearly
delimiting the boundaries of eminent domain as a statute of law, at least so far as those
boundaries have been established by the judiciary, is of critical importance. The history of
eminent domain, and transitions in the accepted reasons underlying its deployment, must be
established to properly consider the statute in its current usage. Furthermore, historical
deployments of eminent domain not just at the local level, but specifically in New York City, are
outlined. I argue that in the Pacific Park case, eminent domain constituted an avenue for
legitimate challenges to city-wide development paradigms. At the same time, however, the
6

statute circumscribed forms of resistance, making other enunciated visions for the project site
illegitimate.
The fourth chapter of this paper provides a detailed history of the project site, outlining
the trajectory of its development up to and including the Atlantic Yards project. In that the
current Barclay’s Center stadium was not the first sports arena imagined at this location, the
history of the site inculcates the persistence of development visions for urban places.
The fifth and sixth chapters analyze the legal and multimedia artifacts produced by the
projects’ developers and opposition, respectively. Here, the documents are interpreted as
embodied spatial imaginaries. The legal battle surrounding the eminent domain taking, in this
sense, is understood as constituting a discourse between and about different visions of
community development in the wedge-shaped area bordered by Atlantic Avenue, Vanderbilt
Avenue, Flatbush Avenue, and Dean Street that make up the project’s footprint.
In the seventh chapter, those multiple imaginaries are re-processed through the lens of
contemporary legal geography. This framework makes room for the multiple imaginaries of
community development while also bringing into focus the ways in which legal proceedings
legitimize certain visions while foreclosing others. Consequently, many of the embodied spatial
imaginaries produced by those in opposition to the development are unrecognized by the
judiciary. Highlighting those visions that are given consideration, along with those that are
dismissed, helps clarify the relationship between legal practice and resistance. By defining the
boundaries of legitimate opposition to certain modes of development, legality simultaneously
allows for resistance and circumscribes how resistance might take shape.
In my concluding chapter, I argue that a reoriented understanding of eminent domain may
help scratch the surface of how complex dynamics of power undergird development in New
7

York City. In particular, I argue that eminent domain ought to be conceptualized as a spatio-legal
process that legitimizes certain spatial imaginations and erases others, and which is characterized
by the tendency to “jump scale” (Smith 1992) in conventional terms, despite existing and
operating in sites that reflect a flat topology (Masrston et al. 2005), or to otherwise confound
traditional hierarchies of scale. Rethinking eminent domain thusly, it is possible to penetrate the
walls that the statute itself erects around legitimate and illegitimate visions of community
development. Lastly, I discuss the current state of the project, and its possible outcomes.
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II. Theoretical Framework
How else to see the Pacific Park project than as one of targeted, bourgeois development?
As a project aimed at remaking the city in an image amenable to the class of real estate moguls,
business owners, and financiers? As a process that necessarily removes the poor and justifies that
removal through legally institutionalized moralizing? And through that removal, reproduces the
poor elsewhere, creating new spaces ripe for development? Indeed, the method that Engels calls
“Haussmann” captured this very process in 1872. He writes,
“No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the
scandalous alleys disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise by the bourgeoisie
on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere
else … The breeding places of disease the infamous holes and cellars in which the
capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished;
they are merely shifted elsewhere!” (1935, 74-77, cited in Harvey 2012, 16-17)
Without a doubt, the Atlantic Yards project fits the mold of Haussmann-ization that Engels
describes, and which has been expounded on throughout the literature on the political economy
of development. Certain facets of the development’s land taking are almost stranger than fiction
in how closely they reflect destructive processes outlined over a century prior. The use of blight
as a justification for the eminent domain taking, thereby invoking an argument that the project
was for the public good, for example, reconstitutes a legacy of blight and sanitation takings
targeting ‘the breeding places of disease’ noted by Engels.
Traditional political economy is useful to the inquiry at hand, but can only take us so far.
If this paper’s goal was to understand how the eminent domain taking was made possible, then a
political economy approach might suffice. But a line of inquiry aimed at understanding the role
of legal practice in circumscribing conflicts of spatial visions must be able to address more than
just one of those visions. Geographers, especially legal geographers, have at their disposal
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analytical frameworks and tools that are uniquely well-suited to address the complex spatialities
and legalities at play in the Atlantic Yards project. The development, however, has received little
consideration in the discipline.
Despite the obviously spatial implications of the Atlantic Yards project, it has garnered
more attention from legal academia than from social scientists working in spatial disciplines.
Legal scholars have discussed the shifting paradigms of eminent domain takings made legible in
the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center case (Lavine & Oder 2010), the manipulations of “public
use’s” fuzzy definition (Kleeger 2011), and the relationship between mobile transnational capital
and urban mega-projects (Schragger 2009). In part, the extensive consideration given to the
project by legal scholars (and the lack of attention from geographers) stems from the
overwhelmingly legalistic nature of the textual artifacts produced through the site’s development
and contestations.
While legal academics are well-equipped to interpret judicial decisions’ intent and
meaning through the framework of precedent, they lack certain analytical techniques available to
geographers. Precedent as a concept in particular generates a hard to navigate terrain, as the use
of decisions from one case as guiding tenets in others de facto flattens the (multiple intertwined,
internally tumultuous) spatialities of each. While some legal academics have made the call in
their own field to embrace political geographic theory (e.g. Ford 1994), the hands reaching
across the aisle have never fully clasped. By predominantly investigating the particular realities
created and recreated through law, legal academics largely situate the spatial within the legal. In
doing so, they obfuscate the dynamic co-production of the two, the ways in which spaces give
rise to legal practice, and the law gives rise to spatial practice.
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This is not to say that legal artifacts and techniques are unimportant or outdated. The
performance of the legal constitutes a primary force in the construction of differentiated places,
and legal geography often interprets places as both socio-legal and socio-spatial materialities.
But legal performativity itself depends on space to provide a variety of geographies upon which
it can act (Blomley 2014). In other words, there is no law without space.
The nature of conventional judicial frameworks, however, renders those interdependencies invisible because precedent asserts that what works in one place will work in
others. In this way, the practice of law (e.g., how laws are written, renegotiated, and enforced)
erases from view diverse spatial imaginaries which constitute the very arena for legal practice.
Recognizing legal constructions of space as imaginaries that are made real through mechanisms
of measurement, representation and enforcement (Santos 1987), the judicial legacies of the
Atlantic Yards project must be interpreted through a discursive framework incorporating both
legal and geographic analytical practices.
Blomley argues that recognizing legality and spatiality as codependent is one thing, but
understanding how such legal geographies work is another entirely. Using this lack of knowledge
as a point of departure, he writes “At least two questions seem to present themselves. First, how
do the subjects of law ‘take up’ legal meaning? This is not entirely clear” (2014, 78). He notes
that critical legal studies and the body of work on legal consciousness would argue that law
shapes beliefs and thoughts, citing David Engel’s (1998) work. But this answer stemming from
legal academia is, unfortunately, still insufficient. Indeed, Engel’s line of reasoning invites more
questioning when reframed through a geographic lens. Blomley consequently pushes back,
questioning how that process of shaping belief proceeds, what the role of spatiality in the
“constitution of legal identity and practice” is, and where the law resides in our day to day
11

encounters (2014, 78). What Blomley points to in this encounter is the failure of legal academia
to sufficiently fold spatiality into its consideration of how legal practice operates.
If legal minds are inclined to elevate legal practice in their conceptualization of how law
governs space, it should come as no surprise. Legal geographers have overwhelmingly fallen into
a similar trap in their tendency to privilege spatial practice over legal practice. A legal geography
that is radically open to both multiple spatialities and multiple legalities simultaneously is
necessary to deconstruct the real, messy, and frequently illogical interactions that make the
spaces of law and the laws of spaces.
David Delaney’s concept of the nomosphere (2010), then, provides a uniquely flexible
tool for examining how Pacific Park came to be. Motivating Delaney’s coinage of yet another
neologism in a discipline already crowded with them is what he identifies as an impasse in legal
geography. The impasse that Delaney describes is characterized by an unbending focus by
geographers on dualisms inherited from the sub-discipline’s academic lineage, which have not
yet been shaken loose. In an attempt to move beyond this impasse, Delaney’s nomosphere
attends to Nicholas Blomley’s call “to find a conceptual language that allows us to think beyond
binary categories such as ‘space’ and ‘law’ (2003, 17).
Hence the nomosphere, which Delaney offers as a framework and tool to take into
account the multiple legalities, spatialities, and scalar imaginations that constitute the
experienced, material world. Delaney offers a provisional definition for the nomosphere as “the
cultural-material envrions that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization of ‘the legal’, and
the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial’, and the practical, performative engagements through
which such constitutive moments happen and unfold” (2010, 25)
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In constructingt his neologism, Delaney draws first on ‘nomos’, the Greek word for law.
His interpretation of the law, however, is more than an as-given condition of life. In defending
his use of ‘law’ to name a concept intended to break free of the law/space dualism, Delaney cites
Pierre Bourdieu’s argument that the Greek ‘nomos’ can be understood as accounting for “the
collocation of space-power-meaning” that gives rise to the very idea of law (1986, 437, cited
Delaney 2010, 25). In the latter half of ‘nomosphere’, Delaney directly draws on the biosphere as
a neologism that proved valuable in reorganizing contemporary thought. Delaney imagines the
nomosphere and nomosphericity as flexibly scalar, in the same way that the biosphere as a
concept can “organize investigations at any scale” (ibid, 24). In the deployment of eminent
domain for the Atlantic Yards development, this attention to scalar flexibility is especially
valuable as the project and its resistances confound traditionally hierarchical understandings of
scale. Nomosphericity offers a language to discuss multiple scalar imaginaries in conflict,
without foregrounding one or eliding another.
In the same way that the biosphere can be used to interrogate the interactions and
relationships between multiple complex biological systems, the nomosphere can help legal
geographers examine multiple actors, operating according to different logics, as interrelated.
Other strands of social theory, including political economy and feminist theory, for example, can
be woven into a nomospheric investigation to better recognize the socio-spatio-legal
interrelations governing a fraught development project such as Atlantic Yards.
Another useful characteristic of the nomosphere is that it does not privilege formal over
everyday socio-spatio-legal practice. Delaney argues that the legal is just one component of the
nomosphere, albeit a component institutionalized and given authority by the state (ibid, 28). This
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structure opens up nomospheric investigations to identify the extra-legal activities of organizers
opposing the Atlantic Yards project.
The legal battle surrounding the eminent domain taking of land for the Atlantic Yards
development can be interpreted as a nomospheric disturbance, a moment when nomospheric
imaginations collide in disharmony. These disturbances, in turn, became ‘the facts’ of the
eminent domain challenge’s legal proceedings, which is the subject of this paper.
Nomosphericity is useful, then, to recognize those facts as only one dimension of a multidimensional conflict. It offers up a tool to escape legal academia and legal geography’s related
traps of situating the spatial within the legal, and the legal within the spatial, respectively. The
nomosphere offers up an organizational framework allowing multiple levels of analysis.
The use of eminent domain to acquire land for the Atlantic Yards project demands an
interrogation of the political economy of development in New York City. But the goal of this
thesis is to do more than understand the motivations underlying the eminent domain taking, or
the judicial logic that allowed it to proceed. In order to interpret the artifacts produced not just in
but around the eminent domain taking as embodied spatial imaginaries, it is necessary to look
beyond a pure political economic analysis.
Conversations that have, at their center, questions about development paradigms have
overwhelmingly favored political economy analyses. And while critiques of neoliberal
development offer a great deal to help understand the logics, imaginations, and tools driving
Pacific Park’s developers, conventional political economy frequently overlooks the ways in
which everyday life in the city constitutes a site of vast neoliberal restructuring (Kern and
Mullings, 2013). Feminist political economy is useful, in this sense, as it sublimates into view
the everyday and the habitual. There is a great deal of alignment between feminist theory and
14

legal geographic theory around the need to focus on how everyday practice normalizes and
produces invisible systems of control. In this sense, interweaving feminist theory with
nomosphericity is rather seamless.
Considering the resistances to the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project, opponents of the
development enunciate an alternative vision for the site through a variety of mediums.
Describing the various modes of placemaking in the city, feminist geographer Leslie Kern
writes, “… a city – its dangers, thrills, culture, attraction, and more – resides in the imagination
as well as in its material form. The imagined city is shaped by experience, media, art, rumour,
and our own desires and fears” (2020, 10). Feminist urban theory is valuable here in that, as a
practice, it lends weight to aspects of daily life that contribute to how cities and places are
produced and reproduced. The stakes in these struggles over development projects and the
character of the urban space are high. Kern argues that the materiality of the city influences the
ways in which social life evolves. The city’s form, she writes, “helps shape the range of
possibilities for individuals and groups. Their form helps keep some things seeming normal and
right, and others ‘out of place’ and wrong” (ibid, 14). The struggle over developments like the
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project have lasting impacts on the built environment, which in turn
has lasting impacts on the social life of the city.
In theorizing the Atlantic Yards eminent domain taking, how to handle scale? Fixing
different actors to different positions within a hierarchical network of scalar relations would be
relatively easy. Community activists were defending their neighborhood, and thusly map onto
the local. Bruce Ratner and his development firm Forest City Ratner, enabled by city planning
offices, map easily onto the city. The financiers who initially underwrote the project, and the
international billionaires who repeatedly bailed the project out of financial crisis map onto the
15

scale of global capital. In almost every case, these obvious scalar associations are echoed in the
language that each actor or stakeholder deploys in describing their vision of the city. Yet this
simple hierarchy fails.
For one, even if we accepted those hierarchical scalar positions, the consequences of each
stakeholders’ actions confound those hierarchies. The impacts of decisions by city-wide PublicPrivate Partnerships (PPPs) are not evenly distributed across the city’s landscape. To the
residents living in the project’s footprint, those impacts are intensely local. Similarly, the
residents’ resistance and opposition to the eminent domain taking stalled the project’s
development, forcing multiple rounds of financing and refinancing from a suite of foreign
billionaires (Zirin 2010) and international development corporations. To the developers and
financiers, the project’s opposition had city-wide, and at points international, consequences.
Neil Smith has described this aspect of resistance as “jumping scale”, which he defines as
the characteristic of being able “to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to
resist oppression at a higher scale – over a wider geographical field” (1992, 60). Smith’s
intervention in rethinking the role and meaning of homeless vehicles provides a useful avenue
for analyzing the relationship between social processes, their physical embodiments, and the
often jumbled and tumultuous relationship between those processes and scale. Following this
intervention, eminent domain can be interpreted as a socio-legal process characterized, in part,
by its capacity to jump scale as it reorganizes economic and social space. The statute
simultaneously expedites the transcending of scale in ways which challenge normally held
relations of power, while simultaneously circumscribing and limiting the reach of resistances to
spatial reorganization. The statute creates avenues for resistance through which otherwise local
actors may challenge hegemonic power at the city, state, national, or even global level.
16

Smith’s concept of jumping scale, however, invokes a top-down conceptualization of
power, itself reliant on a hierarchical imagination of scale. While he allows for disadvantaged
groups to resist oppression at scales different from their own, the concept reinforces scale and its
power-relations as hierarchical. To Smith (and to a suite of others in the field, e.g. Harvey,
Swygdenouw, and Hardt and Negri as well), the global/local binary is constructed such that the
local is subsumed within the global, subjected inherently to be undermined, appropriated, and
acted upon by processes of globalization (Gibson-Graham 2002). Feminist theory offers a more
elegant solution.
Feminist critique provides valuable approaches to unfix dialectics that situate local
resistance within a landscape predetermined to favor city, state, or global power. These analytical
frameworks are similarly instructive for reinterpreting eminent domain as a scalar process
without ceding power to global actors at the expense of local stakeholders. J.K. Gibson-Graham
have posited two strategies for “challenging the power of the global/local binary” (ibid, 30).
First, they suggest that deconstruction provides an analytical lens through which the
binary can be examined and revealed to be incomplete. That within dominant formations of the
global/local binary, the ‘global’ takes on the master term against which the ‘local’ derives any
and all meaning, deconstruction reveals that relation to be incomplete. Rereading the global and
the local as co-productive and concomitant in turn fractures the notion that global power and
global spaces are hegemonic. Gibson-Graham conclude by suggesting that whether
deconstructive practice conceives of the global/local binary as an interrogative perspective (e.g.,
Gibson-Graham (2000) or Dirlik (1999)), as one and the same (as does Doreen Massey (1994),
or as processes (again, Dirlik (1999)), deconstruction largely fails to eradicate the relationship of
differential power that is given to the global/local dualism. Ultimately Gibson-Graham contend
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that while deconstruction allows critics to see the global/local binary as incomplete, those same
critics’ political imaginations may have themselves been globalized, preventing critique from
escaping the binary frame (2002, 35).
Sallie Marston et al. offer a more radical approach to the problem of hierarchical scale in
their argument for a “flat ontology” (2005). Responding to the trend of complexifying scale by
incorporating elements of network relation theory, Marston et al. contend that the concept of
hierarchical scale relies on foundational weaknesses that reform to theory cannot overcome, and
that hierarchical scale fails to explain a wide swath of socio-territorial relations that exist in
practice. This case for a flat alternative is particularly compelling in the context of the Atlantic
Yards – Pacific Park eminent domain taking, in that Marston et al. build on specifically urban
economic applications of hierarchical scale theorizing (e.g. Neil Smith’s concept of “jumping
scale” (1992) and Swygdenow’s neologism “glocalization” (1997)). The spatial concepts that we
receive from scale theorizing ought to be replaced, they argue, with “new spatial concepts that
linger upon the materialities and singularities of space” (2005, 424). Marston et al. lean on
Schatzki’s site ontology theory (2002) as the foundations of a flat ontology. They state,
“a site ontology provides the explanatory power to account for the ways that the layout of
the built environment – a relatively slow-moving collection of objects – can come to
function as an ordering force in relation to the practices of humans arranged in
conjunction with it” (Marston et al. 2005, 425).
Reframing the neighborhood and site of the Atlantic Yards development as a built environment,
or as a site in these terms, opens new avenues for critique that consider the scalar hierarchies at
play without necessarily reproducing those hierarchies in practice.
A key distinction to draw is between theories that destabilize scale and the discursive
application of scale in the struggle over terrain as seen in the Atlantic Yards-Pacific Park
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eminent domain taking and the ensuing legal and sociopolitical battle. The difference is between
scale as ontology and scale as epistemology. Scale as epistemology helps us understand, as
Katherine Jones frames it, how “participants in political disputes deploy scale discursively,
alternately representing their position as global or local to enhance their standing” (1998, 27).
In this light, it can be instructive to understand the resident’s resistance to the eminent
domain taking as a resistance that discursively seeks to jump scale as a political strategy. While
the concept reinforces hierarchical scalar imaginaries in problematic ways, it also accurately
conveys different actors’ self-reflective visions. At the same time, the nomospheric landscape in
which the eminent domain case plays out demands a more fluid, horizontal, and nuanced
conceptualization of scale, such as that offered by Sallie Marston and colleagues. Bringing
feminist critiques of scale into conversation with nomosphericity, the interrogation can proceed
by understanding that nomospheric disturbances may elucidate the fictitiousness of boundaries
meant to divide the global and the local and, in so doing, highlight the ways in which the
local/global binary is fundamentally broken. The eminent domain ruling around the Atlantic
Yards taking is one such disturbance.
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III. Eminent Domain
Originally a prohibition-era speakeasy on Dean Street and 6th Avenue, Freddy’s Bar has a
90-plus year history. The bar first served alcohol illicitly, then as a public offering called
Henderson’s, which catered to the unionized workers at the nearby Spalding Ball factory. The
name “Freddy’s” was never meant to be permanent, but it stuck after the bar was purchased by
Freddy Chadderton, a New York Police officer, in the 70s (The Brian Lehrer Show 2010). Over
time, the bar serviced crowds that ranged from police and firefighters, to groups of anarchist
activists and local artists. The famous rock band Blue Öyster Cult once performed a late-career
show there. In part because it was raining that night, and in part because no one believed such a
famous band would play such a tiny venue, the show was only sparsely attended (Fahim 2010).
The bar closed for business in spring 2010; it fell in the Atlantic Yards project’s footprint. After
years of legal struggle, Freddy’s – along with a number of other properties – was seized through
the deployment of eminent domain powers by the Empire State Development Corporation
(ESDC). The property was handed over to developer Forest City Ratner, which promptly
demolished the bar.
In order to move forward with the Atlantic Yards project, development firm Forest City
Ratner (FCR) had to acquire the land upon which it intended to build. While many real estate
owners willfully sold their properties and land to FCR, not all businesses and landlords were
compliant. Across residents, the decision not to sell to FCR were informed by a wide range of
beliefs, ranging from the inability to negotiate a mutually satisfactory price for the property, to
an unwillingness to part with one’s property due to unquantifiable motivations, such as nostalgia
and sentimentality (as was the case with Freddy’s). Fortunately for FCR, and to the chagrin of
the land owners and tenants who did not want to sell, recent shifts in the deployment of eminent
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domain powers enabled the firm, with advisement and support from a number of governmental
agencies, to take the land. Unsurprisingly, this exercise of eminent domain powers sparked a
drawn out legal battle that proceeded through the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court
in the state.
From a legal perspective, eminent domain can be considered in two ways. First, it is a
constitutional power granted to the state. Different jurisdictions at different scales (e.g., federal
or state) might be constitutionally empowered to deploy eminent domain. Second, it is a process
that is delineated through procedural law. The distinction is that the first framing defines the
right of the federal government or of states to seize private property for public use, and the
second framing defines for each jurisdiction how that seizure can occur.
The power of eminent domain is first and foremost drawn directly from the final clause
of the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. In its entirety, the Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. (US Const. amend. V)
Broadly speaking, the amendment outlines a number of legal rights due to individuals during
legal proceedings. The earlier clauses describe an individual’s right to a grand jury for criminal
proceedings, to immunity from double jeopardy, to not be compelled to self-incriminate in court,
and to due process. It is from the final clause, reading “… nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation” (ibid), that national eminent domain powers (and the
inherited state eminent domain powers reproduced in state constitutions), are derived. And while
the Fifth Amendment establishes national eminent domain powers, it also establishes two
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constitutional preconditions that must be met for public seizure to take place. First, that the
taking of private property must be for public use, and second, that the owner of the private
property must be justly compensated.
The first precondition does more than provide protection to property owners, however.
While it limits takings to those that will be applied towards a public use, it also tacitly implies
that the power by the state to take land is a preexisting right of the state; it does not grant a new
right to the government (United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946)). The underlying notion
– that the right to take land for public use is a sovereign right of a government, gives rise to
eminent domain powers held by states in addition to those held by the federal government. And
while any taking must be for public use, the definition of public use has proved elusive. In 1930,
the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the power to determine whether or not a taking
is for public use lies in the judiciary (Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 444 (1930)). But in a
1954 refusal to define public use, the court constrained its own powers, ruling that the court’s
capacity to determine whether or not a taking is for public use is, in fact, extremely narrow
(Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). Ultimately, the public use clause of the Fifth
Amendment evokes two major questions, both of which the judiciary has declined to give
decisive or lasting ruling towards. First, what constitutes the public? Does it comprise the
residents of a place? Or does it refer to space regardless of who or what is there? And second,
what is in the public’s interest? The latter question is clearly contingent on the first.
At least in general terms, the functioning of the court is to resolve legal disputes and, in
so doing, to clarify ambiguities that exist in the law. As legal interpretations undergo increasing
clarification, precedent is set which determines how lower courts and the states’ police powers
enforce the law, thereby constituting legal practice. It is often remarked that legal practice is
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differentially exercised across people and place. But broad constitutional interpretations that set
the framework for legal practice are, themselves, often in flux. The court reverses rulings, sets
new precedent, limits its own power to interpret, and then broadens those powers on a regular
basis. Legal practice is not only differentially exercised across space, then, but across time as
well. Regarding eminent domain powers, the interpretation of the public use clause has shifted
with the needs and demands of different political moments.
There exists in the popular conception of eminent domain case law the notion that the
Supreme Court ruling in Kelo v. New London (545 U.S. 469 (2005)) constituted a sea-change in
how eminent domain is handled and justified. Critics of the ruling suggested that Kelo would
usher in an era of unprecedented land-takings through the exercise of eminent domain, hinging
on the use of economic development to satisfy the public use requirement. In fact, the economic
development argument had been utilized for decades. Kelo was notable not for the logic
undergirding the state’s taking of land, but for the public backlash against the ruling (Kim 2009).
In Kelo, the City of New London, Connecticut, intended to use eminent domain to
assemble a parcel of land that could be converted into a business district. The use of eminent
domain was critical to a broader development plan approved by the city, which sought to create
over 1,000 new jobs, and to increase tax revenue leading to the revitalization of the city’s
downtown and waterfront districts (Kelo, 268 Conn. 1 (2004)). New London was a city in fiscal
distress. The 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, a federally owned submarine
manufactory, gutted the city’s economy. At the time of the proposed plan, the city’s
unemployment rate was twice that of the rest of Connecticut, and its population was at its lowest
point since 1920 (545 U.S. 469 (2005)). Under these conditions, the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a public-private partnership whose goal was to return the city to economic
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viability, was established. The NLDC negotiated terms with pharmaceutical company Pfizer, and
put together a plan to convert considerable land within the city into an industrial park, wherein
Pfizer would build a research facility. The city authorized the NLDC as its agent to purchase
those parcels necessary for the development, and empowered the NLDC to use eminent domain
where negotiations with private property owners failed.
The challenge to the eminent domain takings quickly escalated from New London
Superior Court to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which affirmed the seizure in 2004. The
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiori (i.e., agreed to hear the case) to an
appeal of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision. At particular stake in the Supreme Court
setting was the question as to whether or not eminent domain could be used to transfer property
from one private owner (e.g., Susette Kelo, the plaintiff) to another (e.g., the Pfizer
pharmaceutical company), and whether the public use clause could be satisfied in that context.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NLDC, again affirming the seizure. In the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens summarizes the dilemma and the unique nature of Kelo:
“Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future
“use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad
with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions,
however, determines the disposition of this case.” (545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005)).
Regarding the first proposition, the majority held that such a transference would indeed be
unconstitutional if the benefit of ownership was exclusive to the receiving party. To this end, the
court referenced its ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, that “a purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate
purpose of government and would thus be void” (467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
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The court then determines that the interpretation of ‘public use’ need not directly map
onto the notion of ‘use by the public’. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens holds that the ‘use
by the public’ standard is inadequate, as it is hard to administer, and that its meaning changes
over time with the demands of society. The majority decision ultimately maintained the court’s
position that ‘public use’ can be interpreted as ‘public purpose’. And the responsibility to define
public purpose, they contend, lies in the legislature and not the judiciary.
The court’s ruling, that the use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private
owner to another is constitutional, given the expectation that the receiving owner would generate
economic growth and with the concession that such growth constitutes a public purpose, is
critically important to the Atlantic Yards seizure. Kelo was decided six to three, with Chief
Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissenting.
Justice O’Connor penned the dissenting opinion, which began by referencing the decision in
Calder v. Bull, that any ruling which takes property from private owner A and confers it upon
private owner B is “against all reason and justice” (3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)). In the dissent to
Kelo, O’Connor contends that the court cedes that basic limitation on government power. As she
sees it, the court’s ruling in Kelo makes all private property vulnerable to takings under the guise
of economic development, and erases the boundaries separating public and private property (545
U.S. 469 (2005)).
Despite the fact that the decision in Kelo seems to elevate the rights of the businessowning class over those of private citizens, the division in the court points to another
interpretation. Of the three dissenting Justices, O’Connor – a staunch centrist – is by far the most
liberal. Justices Scalia and Thomas, who ranked in that court as the most conservative Justices by
far, joined O’Connor in her dissent. If Kelo was a decision in favor of business interests, and at
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an historic moment typified by rampant neoliberalism, what explains the conservative dissent?
How to reconcile the Justice’s well-established positions on the political spectrum with their
seemingly-contradictory opinion in Kelo?
Despite the material effects of the ruling, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas base
their dissent on a political philosophy that valorizes private property ownership and individual
liberties above all else. Eminent domain, as they see it, is an incursion on the right to hold and
use private property. Conversely, the majority ruling in Kelo undermines, at least to some degree,
the sanctity of private property ownership. Kelo only goes so far, however. Upholding Kelo as a
hallmark decision against the tendency to lionize private property would miss an essential point.
While the decision expanded the public use clause’s interpretation, it did not do so in a
way that necessarily makes public use more accessible. The use of eminent domain in Kelo, or in
the Atlantic Yards project, does not yield an urban commons where before there was only private
property. The right of the state to take private property and convert it to a commons – say, a park
– already existed. And while the historical use of eminent domain takings even in those contexts
is fraught with private interests, the jump from urban commons to public use is not so hard to
conceive. Rather, the decision in Kelo expanded the definition of ‘public use’ to include
economic benefits generated from private use by private property owners, in this case those
representing the corporatist class.
In turn, the central argument around eminent domain made in this paper – that it ought to
be reconceptualized as a socio-legal and socio-spatial process – is not an argument for or against
the statute or its deployment. Endorsing the wholesale use of eminent domain to establish urban
commons would need to reconcile an idealized vision of the future with the statute’s legacy and
material effects. Conversely, staunch opposition to eminent domain would fall in line with
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Scalia’, Thomas’, and O’Connor’s political philosophy which elevates private property
ownership over all other types of land use. Reimagining eminent domain as a process leaves
political analysis open to individual cases, allowing a more nuanced interpretation of the public
seizure in the Atlantic Yards project.
The use of eminent domain to take land for Ratner’s Atlantic Yards project, in the context
of New York City development, was by no means novel. Eminent domain played – and
continues to play – a prominent role in the making, shaping, and design of New York City’s
landscape. The historical frame of New York’s most drastic reshaping is typically associated
with the ascendancy of Robert Moses from civil servant to master architect. Moses, who served
as a city planner from the 1920s through the 1960s, deployed eminent domain broadly to rebuild
the city according to his grand, massively scaled, Haussmann-esque vision. Public accounts of
Moses’ vision and methods frequently lionize him, even as the urban planning literature has been
largely critical of his work. The recent commonly held conceptions of Moses border the divine:
at the centennial of his birth, the Long Island Monthly ran a three-page spread of his work titled
“Wholly Moses!”, and credited him with “almost single-handedly ‘creat[ing]’ Long Island”
(Wallock 1991, 340). The fact that Long Island predates Moses by roughly 21,000 years doesn’t
seem to outweigh the gravity his works bear in the popularly held imagination of how New York
came to be.
In fact, the deification of Moses at the hand of New York City’s middle-class is
staggeringly revisionist. Despite his enormous impact on the built environment, his career as a
planner was marked as much by failure as by success. His failed projects, however, have
sublimated away. In his dressing-down of Moses’ legacy, Leonard Wallock enumerates Moses’
grand projects that never came to fruition, including “efforts to construct a Brooklyn-Batter
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Bridge, build a Lower and a Mid-Manhattan expressway, control the city’s airports, block the
Port Authority’s bus terminal, and erect a Rye-Oyster Bay bridge” (ibid, 345). In The
Assassination of New York, Robert Fitch makes the case that Moses’ political clout and public
face allowed him to serve as the Jewish “scapegoat” for the land-holding, goyish “barons” who
sought to profit off the continual redevelopment of New York City (Fitch 1993, 82). Whether or
not Moses’ planning vision took cues from the ultra-rich interests of the Regional Plan
Association, the legacy of his methods hold sway. Robert Moses used eminent domain to cleave
neighborhoods, to displace the poverty-affected cores that had been hollowed out by postindustrialism, and to build in their place massive parks and infrastructure projects.
Outside of Moses’ large-scale projects, perhaps the most iconic example of eminent
domain in New York’s history is in the targeted reconstruction, redevelopment, and rebranding
of Times Square. Following in Moses’ model, the Times Square redevelopment project
constituted an amalgamation of public-private partnerships and development corporations, most
notably the Urban Development Corporation (UDC)2. In their defense of the use of eminent
domain to take the land for the Times Square redevelopment, the UDC constructs a moral
hierarchy that elevates the future commercial possibility of a redeveloped Times Square over the
site’s reality as of 1984:
"Whereas, The Project Area is marked by street crime, substandard and insanitary (sic)
conditions, uses that inhibit the general public’s use and enjoyment of the Project Area,
and physical, economic and social blight which contribute to the growth of crime and
delinquency and impair the sound growth and development of the Project Area and of the
City as a whole; and. . . Whereas, The redevelopment of the Project Area is in the best
interest of the City in that it will remove blight and physical, economic and social decay
and replace them with a variety of new uses which will result in commercial and
2

This method of nesting development interests in a complex web of development corporations,
organizations, and private interests – which was undoubtedly a major contribution of Moses’ to
planning strategy – is also a major feature in the Atlantic Yards project, as will be described in
chapter 5.
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economic expansion, cultural and entertainment rejuvenation and improved public
services and facilities, to the betterment of the Project Area in particular and the City in
general. . .” (New York City Board of Estimates 1984, p.1 and Miller 2002)
Kristine Miller points to two noteworthy aspects of the above justification. First, that the blight
argument – a legal justification for the seizure of land through eminent domain – by necessity
moralizes land use in a way that promotes commercial productivity above all else. And second,
that in public descriptions of eminent domain takings, and in the case law of eminent domain
proceedings, the land that is to be taken is always labeled a ‘project area’, and never a
‘neighborhood’. This is both significant and politically expedient; “the term neighborhood”, she
writes, “implies complex relationships among people and physical locations over time”, while
the term “project area implies a bounded geographic location on which a predetermined program
will take physical form” (Miller 2002, 140). This way of ordering space and time as a
mechanism for value accretion is further explained in Rachel Weber’s 2016 work describing the
performative nature of property cycles. Weber argues that the application of market narratives to
space serves to obfuscate the institutions and human interests that actually create change and to
“position market activity as operating on autopilot, removed from social interests, financial
incentives, or political pressures” (2016, 592). Recognizing a place as a neighborhood rather than
a project area implicitly cedes the understanding that it is a place rich with complex social
networks. A neighborhood being subject to eminent domain takings is twice obliterated: its
erasure is first linguistic, then material.
As discussed previously, while the power of eminent domain is codified in the United
States’ constitution, the language with which it is established extends the power to individual
states. Through procedural law, states define the process through which the power of eminent
domain can be exercised. In New York, those rules are laid out in the New York Consolidated
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Laws Eminent Domain Procedure, or EDP. The law’s first article establishes six objectives
driving the codification of eminent domain in state law: to establish the only legal procedures
under which property may be condemned; to ensure that just compensation is paid to property
owners whose property is being condemned; to mandate opportunities for the public to
participate in the planning process of eminent domain projects; to require that projects be in the
public interest, as well as in the interest of private property owners; to expedite the payment of
compensation to property owners; and to encourage settlement and reduce litigation (NY Em
Dom Pro L § 101 (2012)).
Of the six objectives, two are procedural (the first and third), and one emphasizes the
necessity that a taking be in the public interest (the fourth). The remaining three center the
importance of just compensation to property owners, create avenues to expedite payment to
property owners, and justify legally established incentives for property owners to not seek legal
recourse. It could be argued that the third clause, which is listed above as procedural, in fact
centers the public interest by offering public participation as an avenue through which public
interest might be enunciated. Even if that were the case, though, it is clear in the history of the
Atlantic Yards development, and in many other eminent domain takings, that such a goal is
easily circumvented through complex networks of local benefit corporations, private-public
partnerships, and quasi-municipal bodies that represent project stakeholders while purporting to
be communitarian.
The point here being that the EDP is concerned primarily with the efficacious transfer of
private property, and that the public interest is a secondary consideration. Towards that end, the
law uses an extraordinarily circular definition of ‘public project’, as “any program or project for
which acquisition of property may be required for a public use, benefit or purpose” (ibid, § 103
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(2012)). The law does not define ‘public’, ‘public use’, ‘public benefit’ or ‘public purpose’. As
Kristine Miller notes in her review of the Times Square taking, this broad definition confers
substantial autonomy to local legislatures in how, where, and to what end eminent domain may
be leveraged (Miller 2002, 140).
Even while offering wide latitude to project developers, the law establishes avenues
through which condemnees may voice their opposition to a taking. The process through which
condemnees can contest the taking of their property, what arguments are accepted on their
behalf, and what constitutes evidence to their case is delimited in the statute. Thusly, in the same
maneuver that the law confers a legitimate means of resistance to eminent domain condemnees,
it simultaneously circumscribes the character of that resistance.
Rules for petitioning against an eminent domain taking in New York, where the Atlantic
Yards project stands, are outlined in Article two, section seven of the New York eminent domain
statute. The statute establishes four conditions which may be reviewed by the courts pursuant to
a condemnees petition against an eminent domain taking. Those conditions are, first, that “the
proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions”; second, that “the
proposed acquisition is within the condemner’s statutory jurisdiction or authority”; third, the
court may rule as to whether or not “the condemner’s determination and findings were made in
accordance with procedures set forth in this article” and in accordance with the environmental
conservation regulations established in article eight; and fourth, if “a public use, benefit or
purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition” (NY Em Dom Pro L § 207 (2012)). Three of
the four grounds upon which a court might reverse an eminent domain taking are procedural. In
other words, they do not take into account the facts of the circumstance so much as they take into
account the processes through which those facts are presented and the acquisition occurs.
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Because eminent domain takings are performed by the state itself (or, more commonly,
by a quasi-state actor imbued with the power of eminent domain by the state), the resources
necessary to navigate the procedural landscape defining the statute are stacked very much in the
condemner’s favor. If staffs of legal experts and connections to the different arms of the state
were not resources enough, there is something also to be said for experience. Frequently, the
developers who rely on eminent domain to subsidize their work are frequent users. For Bruce
Ratner, CEO of the Atlantic Yards developer at the time of its eminent domain taking, eminent
domain was far from foreign terrain. Ratner benefited from eminent domain in the taking of 123
parcels of land for the Metrotech development in downtown Brooklyn (Friedlander 2005). In
fact, when plans to found a new Business Improvement District (BID)3 for the Atlantic Yards
project fell through in 2013, FCR instead chose to simply expand the Metrotech BID, run by the
Downtown Brooklyn Partnership, to cover a section of the project footprint including FCR’s
Atlantic Mall (Oder 2015).
Experience, however, is not a resource available to condemnees. A property owner would
consider themselves exceedingly unlucky to receive notice of condemnification more than once.
As discussed above, the EDP delineates the forms of legitimate protest against an eminent
domain taking, and those forms of legitimate protest are largely procedural. That is to say, the
most likely avenue of recourse for an individual or business with property being targeted for
public seizure is to challenge the condemner’s adherence to the process. And while condemnees
are best-situated to argue against a taking on the grounds of public use – themselves being the

3

One of a whole slew of public-private partnerships forming the complex network that facilitate
eminent domain takings for developers, even as it muddies the water for public scrutiny. Other
examples are Economic Development Councils (EDCs) and Public Benefit Agreements (PBAs).
Community boards, which actually represent the public and provide a forum for community
voices, do not have a say in eminent domain proceedings.
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constituents of the public – that is in fact a small corner of the area demarcated for legitimate
protest. It is outside of that boundary, in the realm of legally illegitimate protest, that much of the
social organizing and movement-building work against neoliberal redevelopment takes place.
Ironically, it is in spaces of illegitimate protest, where neighbors find common ground, share
space and food, create protest art together, and uplift one another’s narratives of struggle, that a
sense of community and neighborhood is most strongly crystallized. Nonetheless art, communal
spaces, and neighborly ties do not constitute evidence against a taking according to the eminent
domain statute. Consequently, neighborhoods struggle to seek out legal support – often pro bono
– to help navigate the unfamiliar terrain of legitimized procedural protest.
Ultimately the state’s power to seize private property for public use is an extremely broad
one. While the procedural requirements of eminent domain takings provide some recourse to
condemnees, the primary venue for that resistance is to challenge the process and not the intent.
The result is a conflict stacked in the condemner’s favor. As described above, eminent domain
case law coming out of the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the definition of ‘public use’ to
include the economic benefits that might be conferred by transferring property from one private
owner to another. Public use, in this sense, can map neatly onto the amount of value that can be
extracted from a land resource. The result of this broadened definition is that, when a property is
not being utilized to its maximum economic potential, it may be subject to public seizure and
transferred to another private owner that could extract greater value. Potential condemners or
private recipients of a public seizure asset can leverage this definition alongside expertise in
procedural law to stack the deck heavily in their own favor. As I will show in the next chapter,
this was very much the case in the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park project.
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IV: What Happened, and When
In order to understand how the textual artifacts produced through legal struggle over the
Atlantic Yards project came to be, it is necessary to establish what happened, and when. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a rough timeline of the development process, highlighting
moments that became critical to the ensuing legal battle. Because the opposition to the project
was largely reactive, this chapter tends to give more weight to the developer’s actions. This is not
to suggest that the broad-based opposition to the project was passive during the Atlantic Yard’s
early- and middle-years. The opposition’s work, and a conversation on how their tactics and
legal artifacts can be interpreted as embodied spatial imaginaries, comes later. Furthermore, this
timeline begins in 2003, but there is a case to be made that this project’s timeline extends at least
as far back as the middle of the 20th century. Nonetheless, the conversation picks up in the early
2000s, before official plans were announced.
Rumors that developer Bruce Ratner was in conversations with the owners of the New
Jersey Nets NBA team began in the summer of 2003. The first official word came not long after,
in August 2003, when Charles Bagli of the New York Times reported on plans for Ratner to
purchase the Nets and move them to a new stadium in Brooklyn. The stadium was to be designed
by famed architect Frank Gehry, who designed the Guggenheim museum’s Bilbao location. As
reported, Ratner asked New York City officials to develop a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) “expressing public support for the multibillion-dollar project” (Bagli 2003a). According
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to Bagli, the plan at the time also included moving the New Jersey Devils, a National Hockey
League franchise, to the stadium as well4.
By December of 2003, details of the project started to come to light. With the sale of the
New Jersey Nets still up in the air, the project was presented in as rosy a light as possible, so as
to best woo the team’s then-owners and prospective sellers. The project, Forest City Ratner
claimed, would cost two and a half billion dollars. It would entail refurbishing the Vanderbilt
Yards facility owned by the Long Island Rail Road. The stadium itself – which would seat
19,000 and the roof of which would be a public park with a running track – would cost $435
million. (Bagli 2003b). Frank Gehry described the future stadium as “sheathed in glass”, so as to
be visibly penetrable to passers-by, which they suggested would better incorporate the stadium
into the neighborhood (ibid). During a presentation to Mayor Bloomberg and major potential
investors, Bruce Ratner claimed that the project would not be “economically viable without a
real estate component”, and so the project would also entail the construction of four towers and
4,500 apartments. Ratner requested that the Metropolitan Transit Authority cede some of its land
to his project, and asked that the city condemn the remainder of the footprint under eminent
domain. Most importantly, as Charles Bagli of the New York Times5 reports, Ratner suggested
that the project would be almost entirely privately financed (ibid).

4

This plan almost reached a bizarre, zombified fruition in 2015 when new owners moved the
New York Islanders (another NHL franchise, although much less valuable than the Devils) to the
Barclays Center. The team struggled to draw crowds to the stadium, which was never designed
for hockey in the first place (Bondy 2017). Since then, the Barclays management has reported
that they could make more money hosting concerts and other events over the hockey team. The
team’s ownership is now looking into building a new stadium near Citi Field in Queens, New
York, or moving the team to Hartford, Connecticut (Soshnick 2017).
5

The New York Times were partners with Forest City Ratner; FCR had designed their updated
office space.
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In under two months, Ratner had been approved to purchase the New Jersey Nets, and
did so for $300 million. Though the team could not be moved to Brooklyn until 2008, when their
lease at their New Jersey stadium was set to expire, the acquisition was a linchpin necessary to
move his plan forward (Sandomir and Bagli 2004). The following spring, FCR commissioned
sports economist Andrew Zimbalist to conduct an analysis on their plan’s projected economic
impact. Zimbalist’s report acknowledges that the overwhelming literature on stadium-centered
development suggests that municipalities “should not anticipate a positive economic or fiscal
impact from a new sports facility” (Zimbalist 2004, 1). He then goes on to describe how he
believes the project will be an exception, and that the city and state can expect tax revenues of
$4.1 billion (ibid, 29). Zimbalist, it should be noted, does not have expertise in the area of his
report. While he has written extensively about arena and stadium projects – and often comes out
against them – the Atlantic Yards project only includes a stadium in what is, more broadly, an
urban redevelopment project with the housing market and not the sports market at its core.
In March of 2004 an opposition group – Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) –
formed. DDDB served as the primary microphone for tenants, owners, and community members
who opposed the Ratner project. In their critique, DDDB centers the abuse of eminent domain,
specifically the transference of property to a private entity for a private (not public) benefit.
About a year later, after FCR acquired some properties in the footprint on the open
market, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) issued a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) produced with FCR regarding the construction of
affordable housing in the project’s real-estate component. The agreement in the MOU stated,
pending the project’s approval by a slew of city and state agencies, that ACORN would assist in
developing half of the 4,500 planned residential units as affordable housing. The MOU’s first
36

agreement clause specifies 2,250 affordable units; it’s second clause specifies that ACORN must
publicly endorse and support the project (Atlantic Yards and ACORN, 2005). Put differently,
FCR promised affordable housing set-asides in order to buy a publicity campaign with a
seemingly community-driven organization. The ACORN MOU marks the beginning of a
campaign by the developers promoting the public benefits to be delivered by the project, not just
in its completion but throughout the development and construction process. This campaign
played an integral component in FCR’s attempts to expedite the transference of the Vanderbilt
Rail Yards and a number of other Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) properties to the
developer.
Setting aside the fact that affordable housing units, as calculated by percentage of area
median income in New York City are ‘affordable’ in name only, the 50% goal is a noble one. It
enticed ACORN, and prompted a flurry of articles and announcements extolling the project.
Nine days after the ACORN MOU was announced, FCR submitted a revised plan for the
Atlantic Yards project to the New York City Committee on Economic Development. The plan
expanded the total number of residential units within the plan to 6,000, and with room to move
up to 7,300. The number of affordable units remained unchanged from the 2,250 in the ACORN
MOU. In just under two weeks, the share of affordable housing in the project dropped from 50%
to about 30% (Independent Budget Office 2005).
The campaign to improve the public image, and the image of public benefit, continued
through the summer of 2005, when FCR developed the first Community Benefits Agreement
(CBA) in New York history. CBAs are agreements between real estate developers and
community groups that guarantee some public benefits to be delivered by the project. In
exchange, the community groups are required to publicly support the project, and are barred
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from speaking out in opposition. In essence, CBAs resemble the MOU that FCR entered into
with ACORN, but carry more authority in how they limit public engagement.
Eight groups signed the CBA, including ACORN. The others include Brooklyn United
for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), First Atlantic Terminal Housing Committee
(FATHC), and Public Housing Communities, all housing-oriented organizations; neighborhood
development group Downtown Brooklyn Neighborhood Alliance (DBNA); professional group
New York State Association of Minority Contractors (NYSAMC); and educational group
Downtown Brooklyn Educational Consortium (DBEC). The last, and by far most interesting
signatory, is the All-Faith Council of Brooklyn (AFCB). Regarding AFCB, the CBA reads:
“AFCB will form and facilitate an All-Faith Council, which shall be representative of the
religious diversity within the Community, to establish an ongoing mechanism for community
input for referrals to the jobs, housing and other programs created by this Agreement” (FCR et
al. 2005). The sentence reads as if the verb “form” in “AFCB will form and facilitate” refers to
the following subject, “an All-Faith Council”. As it turns out, it also refers to the object, AFCB
itself. The organization did not exist before the document, and the cast of characters listed as
heads of the organization changed in every succeeding iteration (Oder 2008a).
At the time that the CBA was signed, the rights to the railyards had not yet been sold. The
Metropolitan Transportation Authority had issued a public request for proposals for developers
to bid on the Vanderbilt Yards rehabilitation project. According to the original plan, FCR was
offered $50 million for the rights to the railyards. In July of 2005, after being prompted by the
community advocacy group DDDB, the developer Extell released a counter-bid for the railyards
at $150 million, three times the FCR bid (Extell 2005). Compared to Ratners bid which, at the
time, included a $3.5 billion tower complex alongside the Nets arena and the 6,000 (or 7,000ish)
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residential apartments, the Extell design’s total cost was $1 billion, and included 2,000
apartments. Extell CEO Gary Barnett, however, vowed to not use eminent domain in his
proposal, and the Extell plan only included developing over the railyards (Bagli 2005a). An
appraisal by the MTA put the value of the railyard development rights at around $250 million,
considerably more than either the Extell or FCR offers.
In response to the Extell offer, FCR raised their bid to $100 million (Bagli 2005b); twice
their original offer, but still only two thirds of Extell’s and less than half of the MTA’s appraisal.
About a week later, on September 14, 2005, the MTA agreed to sell the railyards development
rights to FCR for $100 million, undercutting both their own valuation and the Extell bid. When
Peter Kalikow, then the acting chairman of the MTA, was criticized for selling the development
rights for less than their appraised value, he dismissed his own organization’s appraisal. The
$214.5 million value that the MTA arrived at was, he claimed “just some guy’s idea of what it’s
worth”. He argued that the MTA’s appraisal mustn’t be legitimate because neither of the
development bids approached the $214.5 million figure (Bernstein 2005). Basically, the MTA
argued that because they were accepting a lower offer, that their own appraisal must be wrong.
Having won the bid for the railyards development, and having already acquired through
the open market many of the properties necessary for the broader development project, FCR still
had a number of bureaucratic hurdles to clear before groundbreaking could happen. Setting aside
the acquisition of land through eminent domain, FCR had to pass an environmental review and
receive approval from a number of state agencies. FCR, in order to be in compliance with the
State of New York’s Environmental Quality Review (EQR) process, had to produce a Draft
Environmental Impact Scope (DEIS). The purpose of the DEIS is to outline all the aspects of the
project impacts that they intend to analyze, as well as the methods they would deploy in that
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process. FCR published an initial Draft Scope of Analysis in September 2005. After a public
hearing with several hundred community members in attendance, and having received comments
from several community boards and the Council of Brooklyn Neighborhoods, FCR released a
revised Final Scope of Analysis in March 2006. When the project was announced in 2003, FCR
suggested a 10-year timeframe to completion. In the Final Scope presented on March 31st, 2006,
completion of the project’s first phase was pushed to 2010, and the second phase to 2016 (ESDC
2006a). Before construction started, the project was behind schedule.
The Final Scope also states the purpose of the project and, in doing so, sets up the
justification for an eminent domain taking. The Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC),
which authored the Final Scope and serves as a primary public partner for Ratner’s project,
claims that “[t]he overarching goal of the proposed project is to transform an area that is blighted
and largely underutilized into a vibrant mixed-use community” (ESDC 2006a, 7). ‘Blight’ has
been a long-accepted, and just as long ill-defined, rationale for condemnification under eminent
domain. The reasoning that is actually used is more circular than the Final Scope’s language
would suggest. The area is not “blighted and largely underutilized”6, as written. Rather,
underutilization is itself one of the primary metrics used by FCR and ESDC to characterize
blight.
In the fall of 2006, DDDB expanded its opposition to the project from the streets to the
court. After FCR spent the spring and summer promoting the project and raising capital, DDDB
hosted its second annual walkathon, raising over $100,000 to support legal fees for the pending
eminent domain case (Oder 2006). On October 26, 2006, tenants and business owners whose
properties would be condemned filed a lawsuit challenging the eminent domain taking. Daniel

6

Emphasis added.
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Goldstein, a tenant in a to-be-condemned building and one of the project’s loudest critics, served
as lead plaintiff in the suit Goldstein v. Pataki in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). The
lawsuit is field against New York Governor Pataki, alongside a host of public-private partnership
organizations, developers, and businesses, including Bruce Ratner himself, Forest City Ratner
Companies, Forest City Enterprises, Ratner Group, New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg,
the Urban Development Corporation, and several others (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F.Supp.2d 254
(2007)). Judge Robert M. Levy served as magistrate judge on the case (handling discovery and
pre-trial motions), with Judge Nicholas Garaufis presiding.
Proceedings begin in early 2007, with all of the defendants moving to have the complaint
dismissed. Magistrate Judge Levy, in his recommendation to Judge Garaufis, recommends that
the defendants’ request for dismissal be granted (ibid, 256). The defendants’ request was based
on the argument that the case was not ripe, and that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Ripeness, in this context refers to a complaint that is
contingent on future events that may or may not unfold as anticipated. In other words, the
defendants claimed that the complaint against an eminent domain taking was not ripe for judicial
review because the condemnation proceedings had not, at that point, already begun. Further, the
challenge to whether the taking was for public use could not be argued because the actual
outcomes of the development were not yet known. Governor Pataki also invoked qualified
immunity to extricate himself from legal embroilment. Magistrate Judge Levy recommended that
the complaint be dismissed on Burford exemption grounds. In Burford v. Sun Oil Company (319
U.S. 315 (1943)), the U.S. Supreme Court elected to not intervene in a case due to the
disruptions that federal judicial intervention would cause in a complex network of municipal

41

actors and legislative bodies. The defendants in Goldstein v. Pataki claimed that they constituted
such a complex, interwoven network.
Regarding Levy’s recommendations, Judge Garaufis writes that he “accepts and adopts
those recommendations in part, rejects those recommendations in part, and dismisses this
consolidated case in its entirety”7 (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 255 (E.D.N.Y.
2007)), effectively ruling in favor of the developers. Regarding the plaintiffs’ challenge to the
public benefit of the eminent domain taking, Judge Garaufis echoes the U.S. Supreme Court’s
position that it is not up the court to decide what constitutes a public benefit. The decision states
that whether the project’s outcomes constitute a public benefit “may be an important political
question, and if the citizens of Brooklyn are unsatisfied with the answers, then elected officials
may pay the price at the polls” (ibid, 287). In other words, that is a legislative and not a judicial
determination. The plaintiffs did not deny that the sports arena or housing would be built. Judge
Garaufis dismissed the public use complaint, writing that the plaintiff’s allegations concern “only
the measure of a public benefit … as opposed to its existence” (ibid, 287). The extent to which
the project might benefit the community was not up for consideration.
On July 31, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an appeal brief in the United States 2nd Circuit Court
of Appeals to have Judge Garaufis’ decision overturned. The appeal again centers on the public
use clause of the eminent domain statute. The brief challenges the extent to which the project
serves a public purpose, and the notion that community input was taken into account in the
project’s design. Oral arguments took place in October of 2007 before Chief Judge Jacobs and
Circuit Judges Katzmann and Livingston. The appellate court denied the plaintiff’s their appeal

The case was consolidated with another, Piller v. Pataki – wherein another condemnee in the
Atlantic Yards project footprint sued Governor Pataki, state agencies, and the developers.
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in a ruling issued in early February, 2008. In their decision, the appellate judges write that “[a]t
the end of the day, we are left with the distinct impression that the lawsuit is animated by
concerns about the wisdom of the Atlantic Yards Project and its effect on the community”, and
that while the judges recognize the concern of the property owners, “such matters of policy are
the province of the elected branches, not this Court” (Goldstien v. Pataki, 517 F.3d 50, 65 (2nd
Cir. 2008)).
Construction had been largely delayed through legal action up to the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals’ ruling in early 2008, and little progress took place after the 2nd Circuit’s decision as the
developers managed small changes in the project plan. In June of 2008, the United States
Supreme Court denied to grant certiorari to the Atlantic Yards eminent domain case (although
Justice Alito noted that he wanted to review the Second Circuit’s decision). The Supreme
Court’s denial effectively ended any opportunities for opposition to the project in federal court.
The plaintiff’s lawyer, Matthew Brinckherhoff, stated that the petitioners would be filing another
lawsuit against the developers in New York State court (Chan 2008).
In September of 2008 the subprime mortgage crisis spilled over into the investment
banking world with the filing of bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers. Construction on the railyards
portion of the project stopped in early December of that year. The ESDC claimed that the
stoppage was due to pending litigation, but an MTA spokesperson claimed on December 4th that
the agency had not yet received the $100 million dollars from FCR for the property (Oder
2008b). In mid-December, the Wall Street Journal reported that the project architect was ordered
by FCR to cancel work on the project; Frank Gehry laid off his two-dozen or so Atlantic Yards
staff. The Wall Street Journal linked the halt and cancellation of the Gehry contract to a pending
loan that FCR had taken out with Gramercy Capital Corporation. The loan had accrued to $177
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million, and was scheduled to come due two months hence, in February. While FCR was in talks
to extend the loan, evidence suggests that the developer lacked the funds to both continue the
project and make good on their debt (Wall Street Journal 2008). At this point, the stalls in
construction due to both legal challenges and financial upheaval had reshaped the environment
for the project.
The pressure – both legal and financial – pushed FCR to once again alter its plans for the
arena and surrounding development. The ESDC released, in June 2009, a Modified General
Project Plan (MGPP) to the Atlantic Yards Land Use Improvement Civic Project. The MGPP
included the acceleration of bureaucratic approvals and of government funding, including
through the issuance of triple tax exempt municipal bonds; a reduction by about one third in the
size of the project FCR is required to build; an “economic benefit analysis”; and a defense of the
anticipated ten-year project timeline, issued without reference to the fact the project was already
years behind schedule (UDC d/b/a ESDC 2009). The project and its proposed benefits had
changed drastically.
The community members opposing the plan, having exhausted any opportunity for relief
in federal court, subsequently revitalized their eminent domain case in New York State Court.
The basis of their argument claims that, even accepting the decision regarding the original plan’s
public use benefit, the MGPP was so drastically different that it should not be permitted to stand
on the previous case’s merits. The court agreed to hear the case when in session the coming
October (State of New York Court of Appeals 2009). Alongside the appeal, the community also
promoted an alternative development plan for the railyards, titled Understanding Imagining &
Transforming the Yards (or UNITY). The plan is posited as a “viable development alternative to
the proposal by Forest City Ratner Companies” (The Center for Community Planning and
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Development 2007, 5). The plan, originally published in 2007, was an update to the Extell plan
that had been developed alongside community stakeholders.
The eminent domain case was heard for the last time in the New York State Court of
Appeals in fall of 2009. During oral arguments, the plaintiff’s counsel drew considerable
attention to the question of whether or not economic development constitutes a public use in the
spirit of eminent domain law. The Empire State Development Corporation’s counsel focused
primarily on whether or not the court had jurisdiction, questioning whether the plaintiffs were in
compliance with a 30-day limitation on filing a petition. The decision was 6 to 1, with judge J.
Smith penning an extremely brief dissent. Plaintiffs filed a motion to re-argue the case in the
Supreme Court of New York, but that motion was denied in March of 2010 (Goldstein v. New
York State Urban Development Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation, 13
N.Y.3d 511(N.Y. App. Div. 2009)). The ruling in favor of ESDC was understood as “the last
major hurdle” for the developers, who moved to sell a series of triple-tax-exempt bonds so as to
begin financing construction almost immediately. At the same time, Ratner began conversations
to sell the Nets basketball team to Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov – constituting another
massive injection of capital into the project (Bagli 2009).
After the lawsuits challenging the eminent domain takings died, project opponents
continued to resist the development through procedural and administrative legal practice. The
project moved forward, albeit somewhat hampered. The lasting effects of the legal battle and
resistances are reflected in the shifting project plans, timelines, and owners. The site is still under
construction, many years behind schedule, and the built environment today only vaguely
resembles the plans laid out in 2003.
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V: Developers, mapping, and imagining a neighborhood
What was Bruce Ratner’s vision for the neighborhood and community, postdevelopment? To be certain, the project served as a vehicle through which Ratner could
accumulate both monetary wealth and real estate assets in an extremely valuable market, but the
language of the development project suggests more than that. Critical engagement will, of
course, take Ratner’s broad pronunciations for community growth with a block of salt;
descriptions of an uplifted neighborhood post-development served the project’s financial
objectives. But even if the developers’ interests in the neighborhood were exclusively financial,
the means by which they sought to extract financial value demanded that they interpret the
neighborhood and evoke alternative imaginations for it. At a bare minimum, the developers had
to envision a land use transformation that complied with eminent domain law, even if the
interpretation of that law hedged in their favor from the onset. Wrapped up in this process of
visioning the community, to whatever ends, the developers necessarily produce one possible
imagination of the neighborhood as it could be.
Ratner and his co-developers in the Empire State Development Corporation made
extensive use of visual signifiers to reimagine the neighborhood in several ways. Maps in
particular were commonly deployed as a means by which the developers could delimit and
define the neighborhood, identifying areas that they believed needed improvement, and
legitimizing the spatiality of their intended corrections. Mapping and cartography have
historically been employed by those in power to (re)establish legitimacy through the invocation
of data and objectivity that is made to seem unquestionable. This strategy is effective because
map readers frequently “work from the premise that mappers engage in an unquestionably
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‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ form of knowledge creation” (Harley 1989, 1). To their end, Ratner and
his fellow developers very much counted on the courts to interpret their mappings in this way.
Following Harley’s call for an epistemological shift in how readers interpret maps and
cartographers’ assertions about them (ibid), it is worthwhile to reread the maps produced by the
Atlantic Yards developers. Reading ‘inbetween the lines’ of the developers’ maps allows an
analysis that makes visible the very objects that the cartographers sought to obfuscate – the
presence of communities, of livelihood, and of a vital community. Furthermore, deconstructing
the developers’ maps clarifies their conceptualization of the neighborhood. Not unlike how early
cartographers used maps to delineate territories for resource extraction, colonization, and the
production of surplus value, the maps used by the Atlantic Yards developers’ make explicit an
imagination of the neighborhood under the Atlantic Yards footprint as a place ripe for value
maximization. Such an analysis unveils a great deal of the spatial and scalar imaginations that
underpin their mode of development.
That the judiciary proved so amenable to the impositions, expectations, and meanings
conveyed by the developers is far from surprising. This susceptibility to outside influence is
characterized in Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ interpretation of transitions in legal practice from
enlightenment into the modern era. The law, de Sousa Santos argues, has undergone a
Nietzschean metamorphosis in reverse: beginning idealistically and now being dominated by
outside influence (de Sousa Santos 1987). The developers’ maps of the footprint serve as the
primary vehicle for that influence.
It is not shocking, then, that a great deal of the developers’ mapping work served as the
backbone of their legal argument justifying the use of eminent domain to condemn a
considerable portion of the project’s footprint. As discussed previously, the developers’ central
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argument was that the area was characterized by ‘blight’ – an amorphous term that has been
regularly accepted as a legitimate basis for condemnation. The ESDC’s “Atlantic Yards Arena
and Redevelopment Project: Blight Study” makes extensive use of maps and photographs to
ultimately argue that “the 22-acre area proposed for the Atlantic Yards Arena and
Redevelopment Project (“project site”) is characterized by blighted conditions” (2006, i), and
that those conditions cannot be rectified without public intervention.
The formal definition of blight, in the New York State Constitution but in most other
states as well, is already chimerical. By state law, condemnations to address blight are admissible
with the presence of “substandard and insanitary” conditions (NY CONST. art. XVIII, § 1).
Despite the generality written into the state’s constitution, it is clear that the interpretation of
Article XVIII at its inception was in fact much narrower. The first case to interpret the
amendment described the law as pertaining only to “slum areas” (Murray v. Laguardia, 52
N.E.2d 884 (NY 1943)). The movement to expand the definition of blight came well after these
initial cases (Somin 2011), and has been an effective tool to expedite condemnation proceedings.
While many jurisdictions rolled back economic development justifications for eminent domain
takings in the aftermath of the Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of New London, the definition of
blight has remained expansive, and continues to do much of the same work as the economic
development argument (ibid). Making the case that the project footprint was blighted was
necessary for Ratner and the ESDC to unlock condemnation powers.
The Blight Study also serves as a clear example of how property cycles and market
activity are produced and performed. Urban planner and economic geographer Rachel Weber
argues that market cycles are not naturally occurring patterns, but are rather constructed
interpretations imposed on markets in hindsight and produced through performativity. Weber
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frames performativity in this context in the sense that “economic models and constructs help
produce or enact the phenomena that they ostensibly describe” (2016, 593). Markets or cycles
cannot be performed without actors, and Weber identifies the actors that make up a local real
estate market as an epistemic community made up of market analysts, planners, developers and
financiers, among others, which deploy market devices, analyses, and projections according to
cyclical thinking, producing cycles in turn (ibid, 488). Weber argues that market cycles are
performed in three primary ways. First, markets are set up to cycle because they rely on
professionals using market devices which themselves contain “assumptions about appropriate
timing of investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment.” Second, that market actors behave
“collectively in concert”, which serves to smooth cyclical trends. And third, that the cycle
metaphor offers an ordering of time that makes speculation on the future more enticing to
financial interests (ibid, 588). In the case of the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park project, the Blight
Study can be understood as one such market device, deployed by market actors in order to
perform a cycle of investment.
The Blight Study is broken up into six sections, with a number of appendices. The
sections include a) an introduction to the project and explanation of the Blight Study’s analytical
framework; b) a history of the area and overview of the site’s current condition; c) the physical
and use characteristics of the properties in the footprint; d) a description of crime rates in the
area; e) their explanation of the benefits of the proposed project; and f) a description of property
ownership in the footprint. Maps and photographs are used most extensively in the third section
(Section C), which documents the physical and land use characteristics of the blocks that fall in
the redevelopment zone. In Section C, each block within the property is mapped, and each
property within the block was photographed. The Blight Study also deploys some quasi50

quantitative data in the fourth and fifth sections.
Each of the maps in Section C are remarkably similar, and each block is described in
painstaking detail. The accompanying maps are simple – the area is shown in clean, straight
black lines. Few features are given besides the block number, outlines of tax parcels within each
block, and labels for the neighboring streets. Indeed, most blocks use the same map, and simply
highlight which block and lot are being described with a simple arrow pointing to the lot on the
map, as demonstrated in the three maps (Figs. 1 – 3) below:

Figure 1 – ESDC Blight Study Map of Block 1127, Lot 19 (ESDC 2006, C-90)

Figure 2 – ESDC Blight Study Map of Block 1127, Lot 50 (ESDC 2006, C-130)
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Figure 3 - ESDC Blight Study Map of Block 1127, Lot 56 (ESDC 2006, C143)

Any descriptive flourishes missing in the maps themselves are made up for in the Blight Study’s
accompanying descriptions of the lots. Each lot is systematically described along seven vectors:
land use, property ownership details and current zoning; unsanitary and unsafe conditions;
indications of structural damage; building code violations; occupancy/vacancy status;
underutilization; and environmental concerns. These attributes, taken in sum, congeal into the
ESDC’s argument that the area is characterized by blight. The study states, “As described in
detail throughout this report, the 22-acre project site is characterized by blighted conditions
including structurally unsound buildings, debris-filled vacant lots, environmental concerns, high
crime rates, and underutilization” (ESDC 2006, iii).
Following the maps, the study then lists photographs of each site, highlighting the
described conditions. Absent from the maps in the Blight Study are any measure of community
or human activity within the blocks and lots. However, the Blight Study ought not be judged on
the criteria of something it doesn’t itself purport to be. It plays a specific role in articulating the
developers’ conceptualization of the neighborhood, and points to an intentional and strategic
alignment with the judicial position on measuring public benefit in eminent domain takings. In
other words, the Blight Study needs to only make the case that there are blighted conditions, and
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that the project would yield a public benefit by improving upon those conditions. Any question
of how the costs associated with providing that benefit measure against the neighborhood’s
existing positive attributes is immaterial to the public seizure case. This strategy, further, allows
the ESDC to veil their imagination of the neighborhood (as a vehicle for profit) in seemingly
objective language and media.
The accompanying land use, property ownership, and zoning description accompanying
the map of Block 1127, Lot 19 (Fig. 1) relies heavily on pseudo-scientific language in order to
describe particular, targeted attributes of the space. It begins:
“Lot 19 is located at 620 Pacific Street, between 5th and 6th Avenues. Until Spring 2006,
the lot was occupied by a vacant two-story, 3,158 gsf structure, which was formerly an
auto repair shop (see Photograph A). The building was demolished by AYDC with
approval from ESDC because of its dangerously deteriorated condition, as described
below.
Lot 19 is located in an R7A zoning district with a C2-4 overlay. R7A districts permit
medium-density housing with a maximum FAR of 4.0. C2-4 districts accommodate retail
and personal service shops needed in residential neighborhoods. When mapped in R7
districts, the maximum commercial FAR in C2-4 districts is 2.0. Lot 19 is owned by
AYDC, which purchased the property in April of 2006.”
(ESDC 2006, C-90)
The description reveals some glaring absurdities in the logic driving the development. First, the
Blight Study is being conducted on properties already owned by the Atlantic Yards Development
Corporation (which is yet another subgroup under the ESDC umbrella). The property whose
condition is being touted as evidence for the need to exercise eminent domain – because it might
be blighted – is already owned by the developers, negating the need for acquisition via public
seizure. Second and more farcical still, the buildings on that property were demolished by the
developer prior to the Blight Study’s publication. The photographs referenced in the property
ownership description (Fig. 4-6) show a property that was leveled long before the Blight Study
was conducted. Subsequent photographs included in the Blight Study show the building’s
53

crumbling interior, dilapidated walls and heaving subfloors. The Blight Study does not clarify
when the photos were taken. Given the timeline of the Blight Study relative to the property’s
demolition, it is entirely conceivable that those photographs document the demolition process or
the neglected state of the property after it was sold to AYDC, and not the status quo pre-AYDC
acquisition.

Figure 4 – ESDC Photograph 1127-19-A (ESDC 2006, 91)
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Figure 5 - ESDC Photograph 1127-19-B (ESDC 2006, 92)

Figure 6 - ESDC Photograph 1127-19-C (ESDC 2006, 93)
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Even accepting that the photographs accurately document the condition of the buildings prior to
demolition, the logical argument that the condition of properties owned by an ESDC subsidiary
should justify the taking of other properties through eminent domain is shaky at best.
A considerable portion of each block and lot’s description in the Blight Study discusses
the use and utilization of the spaces, and these attributes prove integral to the case that the overall
area is characterized by blight. Utilization as the Blight Study defines it is ontologically narrow,
focusing exclusively on the maximization of built space under current zoning regulations. A
typical utilization review, in this case for Block 1127, Lot 46, reads: “Lot 46 is located in a R6B
zoning district with an FAR of 2.0. According to current zoning, the 1,550 sf lot could
accommodate up to 3,100 zsf of built space. The 2,400 gsf building currently located on the lot
utilizes approximately 77 percent of the lot’s development potential” (ESDC 2006, C-122).
Block 1127, Lot 46 is occupied by a multi-family residential building, which at the time
of the Blight Study had also been purchased by the AYDC. The underutilization argument takes
into account the Floor-Area Ratio (FAR) permitted under zoning (the allowable ratio of the
building’s built square footage compared to its zoned lot size), and compares it to the current
Gross Square Feet (GSF) (the actual amount of built space on the lot). For Block 1127, Lot 46,
the FAR is 2.0, meaning that it is legal to build a building with up to two times the total square
footage compared to the zoned lot size. In simple terms, a building that occupied the entire lot’s
footprint could be two stories tall, or a building that occupied half of the lot’s footprint could be
four stories tall. Because this lot is 1,550 square feet and its zoning allows for a FAR of 2.0, a
building may consume up to 3,100 GSF. The current building, with 2,400 GSF utilizes only 77
percent of the lot’s development potential. The language used in the Blight Study to describe
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utilization is uniform from lot to lot. The study uses the language as a template and fills in the
numbers for each block and lot. ‘Utilization’ in this sense refers only to the share of allowable
square feet that a building may occupy, and not how the building is used, or by whom.
Calculating and demonstrating undeveloped potential square footage is pivotal to the
developers’ claims of underutilization, which constitutes the bridge between blight and economic
development. Unrealized potential for built space translates into a failure to maximize the
space’s use value. In the eyes of the developers, that undeveloped square footage could be an
additional residential unit to be rented out, or a larger retail space to attract a higher-paying
business tenant. Utilization as the ESDC frames it can be understood as synonymous with profit
maximization. The existing homes and businesses on these properties are reduced to a block-lot
identifier, and are further reduced to a vehicle for value generation. In this rhetorical and pseudoscientific shift, utilization comes to mean a property’s capacity to generate profit. Other
frameworks for understanding utilization are erased in the process.
What the developers are seeking here is to recover the value lost in the rent gap between
the lot’s current and potential utilizations. Whether or not the plan is to retain the property, act as
landlord and extract rent from tenants, or to sell off the property after its acquisition, the logic is
the same. Neil Smith defines the rent gap as “the gap between the actual capitalized ground rent
(land value) of a plot of land given its present use and the potential ground rent that might be
gleaned under a ‘higher and better’ use [emphasis in the original] (1987, 462). Smith further
identifies the role of historically cyclical investment and disinvestment in the rent gap’s
production, and argues that gentrification is a means of closing that gap.
Deconstructing the Blight Study reveals two major aspects of the logic underpinning the
developers’ bid for an eminent domain taking. The first is the analysis of properties already
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owned by the AYDC to justify the taking of other properties. This strategy works because,
according to precedent in eminent domain law, an area need only be characterized by blight for
parcels within it to be condemnable; it is not necessary for each parcel to be identified as
blighted individually. The developers, in seeking the use of eminent domain for the Atlantic
Yards project, effectively called for public action to address a problem that they literally owned.
The second major aspect of the logic driving public seizure is the leap from underutilization (as
conceived of as a rent gap) to blight.
The rent gap argument makes clear that Ratner (and the city as represented by the publicprivate partnership) imagine the neighborhood in primarily monetary terms. Their
conceptualization of the community is rooted foremost in an understanding of the city as a means
of capturing value. This is not surprising. Samuel Stein labels this formation of the city and its
relation to value maximization through real estate planning the Real Estate State (2019). A core
ideology of planning under the Real Estate State is the idea of ‘highest and best use’, which
“turns land use planning into real estate appraisal, positing that the best use for any piece of land
is that which derives the greatest value at the lowest cost and allows buildings to actualize their
full potential rent” (ibid, 65).
In the case of the Atlantic Yards project, the argument for eminent domain made by the
developers reveals that the systems in which that mode of value capture is possible (i.e.,
neoliberal urbanism) are riddled with internal contradictions. The Atlantic Yards project itself
would be untenable without the manipulation of the real estate market by the state through
eminent domain and other state interventions such as rezoning and the issuance of tax exempt
bonds. Furthermore, the action advocated by the developers’ is not for the city to directly address
blighted conditions in the project area, it is to take the land and cede it to the developers for
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demolition and reconstruction. To what public benefit, then is economic development in this
context? The value captured by bridging the rent gap will either be held by FCR – a private firm
– or will be sold to new prospectors also within the private sphere. Even accepting that economic
development is a public use, it ought to follow that the public be the beneficiary of the
anticipated economic windfall.
Deconstructing the text and images from the ESDC Blight Study shows that the project’s
developers strategically framed the arguments in the Blight Study along two main axes. The first
was to exploit the judiciary’s self-imposed limitations in defining public use. The developers
understood that eminent domain case law dictates that only the existence of a public benefit is
necessary to justify public seizure, and that the measure of that benefit against the benefit of
keeping lands as they are is a non-factor. This understanding is shown in the Blight Study’s
framing, and underscores the power differential between the developers who have frequently
deployed eminent domain and the residents who were navigating that terrain for the first time.
Further, the conflation of economic development with blight is not only consistent with a
political-economic analysis of the developers as private entities in the capitalist class, but aligns
with a broader framing of the city as a vehicle for profit generation through real estate
maximization. This is underscored by the direct relationship of the project’s private developers to
the city through public-private partnerships and quasi-public institutions such as the ESDC. That
mapping was deployed as a spatial strategy to anchor these frameworks further stresses the need
for geographers to more thoroughly engage with eminent domain as a subject.
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VI: Residents, opposition, and alternative visions
The community activists and stakeholders that most vocally opposed the Atlantic Yards –
Barclays Center (AYBC) development project were coded as ‘local’ in the predominant media
coverage describing the dispute, and placed in contrast to the developers whose power was coded
according to traditional hierarchical scales as emanating from the state (the political entities
enabling the development), and as ‘global’ (the capital leveraged to make it happen). A March
29th, 2004 New York Times article covering a rally in opposition to the project neatly captures
this framing. In it, the protesters are “Brooklyn residents and business owners”, but their political
positions are glossed over to instead emphasize that a “group of people played guitars, a
mandolin and an accordion as they sang a hootenanny-style ballad called ‘Don’t Tear it Down’”
(Moynihan 2004). The New York Times depicts the protesters as backwoods holdouts opposed
to the inevitable and unquestioned advancement of a new urbanism. The protesters’ politics, in
this presentation, are replaced with a spatial and scalar identity, which is then used to describe
them as out of sync with the trajectory of urban development.
The content of the rally and of the ensuing years-long struggle to stymy the Atlantic
Yards – Barclays Center development project by its opponents, however, unveils a much more
complex position. The projects’ detractors produced through resistance a wide array of textual
artifacts; documents and artworks that simultaneously capture and progress their opposition. The
objects produced through this resistance target a variety of audiences, such as other so-called
local actors, city officials, developers, state-wide public-private partnerships, and multiple tiers
of the city, state, and federal judiciary. The diversity of documents, and their content, promotes a
reinterpretation of the project’s opposition that unseats commonly held scalar imaginations of the
resistance as ‘local’, and AYBC and its allies ‘global’.
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The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the documents and textural artifacts produced
through resistance to the AYBC project, using a theoretical framework that accommodates the
complex ways in which anti-development action navigates and deploys scale as it interweaves
legalistic solutions with community-driven tactics. In a community meeting captured in the film
‘Battle for Brooklyn’ (Hawley & Galinsky 2011), civil liberties attorney Norman Siegel
addresses a concerned resident and compares the opposition to the biblical story of David and
Goliath, a poetic attempt to invoke scalar power. The texts deconstructed here include certain
legal documents produced through the formal challenge to the eminent domain taking, film and
art produced as a component of community activism, and alternative urban planning proposals.
The former manifests the most direct confrontation with the Atlantic Yards-Pacific Park project’s
developers, while the latter contextualize the legal proceedings and improve the vantage point
from which the legal process can be understood, while deploying scale discursively to generate
soft power.
Even accepting that the kind of neoliberal urban development characterized in Forest City
Ratner’s Atlantic Yards-Pacific Project is the prevailing mode of planning, guided by the logic of
capital, those modes and logics are far from universal. As an array of feminist theorists have
pointed out, there are diverse ways of being, even in and through capitalism. Recognizing the
alternatives offered by the AYBC’s opposition as “pericapitalist” forms of urban development –
that is, modes that are simultaneously contained by and eluding capitalism (Tsing 2015, 63) –
furnishes an analysis of the project’s opposition with critical importance.
Despite their strategies that cut across traditional notions of scale, the key actors in the
resistance often describe themselves in language that reinforces the global-local dialectic. In the
film “A Walk Through the Footprint”, produced by Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB),
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the advocacy group’s founder David Goldstein summarizes the landscape of resistance. He says,
“This is not just a fight against Ratner. I mean, City Hall is behind this, Albany is behind this.
The community boards are not interested in hearing what people who actually live and rent here
think. This has been imposed on us” (DDDB 2006). Goldstein is right, but he also sells his
movement short. In this excerpt he reinforces a few familiar notions in the global-local dialectic,
as illuminated by J.K. Gibson-Graham. First, that the dialectic is brought to bear in the practice
of everyday life, and is therefore real. Second, that the relationship of the global to the local is
one of containment; that the local is understood to fall within, but is still separate from, the
global. And Third, that the power-dynamics defining the global-local dialectic are lopsided in
favor of the former such that the global may impose its whims and follies upon the local
(Gibson-Graham 2002).
The dialectic that Goldstein frequently reinforces, while in some cases strategic, is
complicated by his own group’s goals and achievements8. That DDDB and its community
partners are advocating for themselves at a variety of scales undermines an analysis that
considers each actor as occupying specific scalar positions within a hierarchical or tiered
framework. Furthermore, the impacts on the project driven by its opponents disprove
commonplace assumptions, often expressed by the opponents themselves, about the one-sided
power relationship that defines hierarchies of scale. While the community members opposing the

8

Goldstein himself is a complicated character and potentially an unreliable narrator at the
forefront of the residents’ movement. The documentary ‘Battle for Brooklyn’ (Hawley &
Galinsky 2011) describes a rift among the neighborhood’s residents and their buy-in to the
opposition efforts, with lower- and middle-class, longer-term residents on one end and
professional-class, newer residents on the other. For the latter group, of which Goldstein is a
part, a primary concern with the development is the impact it will have on their home values.
This concern complicates the opposition particularly as they cast the developers and involved
politicians as capitalists disinterested in the neighborhoods character; many of the residents’
concerns stem from a related monetary logic.
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development deployed scale discursively for political power, the tangled actions and
interrelationships between themselves, the community, the developers, and other players in the
landscape suggest that hierarchical scale models do not accurately capture the reality on the
ground.
The fact that AYBC’s opponents have effectively resisted the development may not seem
obvious when standing on the corner of Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues, where the Barclays
Center now looms to the north, and where the nearby skyline is anointed with new high-rise
buildings. But comparing the state of the development today to its proposed timeline, it becomes
clear that the project’s opponents have influenced the built environment. In more abstract terms,
there is a recognizable distance between the reality of the space today and the spatial imaginary
of the developers who believed the project would be completed in 2016. The ways in which the
site diverges from the developers’ imagination were produced in part through the project’s
opponents performing the (socio-) legal and the (socio-) spatial. Specifically, the negotiation of
competing imaginaries through the eminent domain process gave rise to legal, financial, and
social materialities that hindered the developers’ progress. The resulting situation – the actual
site as it is today – is the product of those entangled and diverging spatial, scalar, and legal
imaginaries.
The project, originally slated for completion by 2016, is years behind schedule and it is
likely that it will never be finished as intended. From within a hierarchical conceptualization of
urban scale, then, it appears that AYBC’s opponents have in their resistance effectively ‘jumped
scale’. While Neil Smith used the term to describe ‘homeless vehicles’ – operative sculptures by
artist Krzysztof Wodiczo that constitute an intervention in the landscape of homelessness – it fits
aptly in the struggles over the AYBC project. Smith defines jumping scale as the characteristic of
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being able “to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to resist oppression at a
higher scale – over a wider geographical field” (1992, 60).
Smith’s understanding of jumping scale invokes a top-down conceptualization of power
that itself relies on a hierarchical imagination of scale. While he allows for disadvantaged groups
to resist oppression at scales other than their own, his framework does not push against the
conceptualization of scale and its power-relations as hierarchical or vertical. J.K. Gibson-Graham
argue that to Smith (and to Harvey, Swygdenouw, and Hardt and Negri as well), the global/local
binary is constructed such that the local is subsumed within the global, subject inherently to be
undermined, appropriated, and acted upon by processes of globalization (2002). Feminist critique
as a method provides valuable approaches to unfix dialectics that situate local resistance within a
landscape predetermined to favor city, state, or global power. These analytical frameworks are
similarly instructive for reinterpreting eminent domain as a scalar process without reinforcing
hierarchies that elevate global over local actors. J.K. Gibson-Graham have recommended
deconstruction and resubjectivation as two strategies for “challenging the power of the
global/local binary” (ibid, 30). Having identified both the values and shortcomings of
deconstructing the global/local binary (as I described in Chapter 2) Gibson-Graham turn to
resubjectivation, which they define as “a set of embodied interventions that attempt to confront
and reshape the ways in which we live and enact the power of the global” (ibid, 30). What would
it look like to submit the Atlantic Yards-Barclays Center project’s opposition to a course of
resubjectivation?
Foremost, the givenness of hierarchies used to describe the actors in the fray – the residents
and Atlantic-Yards project developers – must be called into question. The easiest way to
reimagine the actors’ scalar positionality is to set aside the self-descriptive language they employ
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and focus instead on the impacts of their work. This line of critique draws on Marston et al.’s flat
ontology (2005) alongside Katherine Jones’ explanation of how parties in political disputes
deploy scale “as a representational trope, a way of framing political-spatiality that in turn has
material effects (1998, 27). In this sense, it is easy to see the developers as simultaneously local
and global, or as neither. The developers’ work, which is motivated in part by the logics and
power of global finance, produces globalized changes in space (opening up real estate for
international investment; mobilizing multi-national capital through a global city), at the same
time that it creates local change (rezoning a neighborhood; building over an exposed railyard;
creating new jobs and housing) within the rough boundaries of a neighborhood, or the ‘site’. The
same is true for the project’s opponents. Their efforts towards community self-determination and
–actualization also have global impacts, such as stymying financial investment and transforming
the narrative surrounding developers.
Smith’s intervention in rethinking the role and meaning of homeless vehicles provides a
useful avenue for analyzing the relationship between social processes, their physical
embodiments, and the often jumbled and tumultuous relationship between those processes and
scale. Following this intervention, eminent domain can be interpreted as a socio-legal process
characterized, in part, by its capacity to jump scale as it reorganizes economic and social space.
As a socio-legal process, jumping scale in this context happens within the discursive deployment
of traditional hierarchies, and affects sites within the real world that are simultaneously many
scales, or are flat. The eminent domain statute simultaneously expedites the transcending of scale
in ways which challenge normally held relations of power, whilst circumscribing the reach of
resistance. The statute creates avenues for resistance through which site-based actors may
challenge hegemonic power across a variety of sites, including cities, states, or nations. We can
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interpret project opponents’ community activism mobilizations that happened in parallel with
their legal challenge as part of a flat or trans-scalar entanglement.
The homeless vehicles to which Smith refers are sculptures made by the artist Krzysztof
Wodiczko. Smith’s intervention is especially relevant, as multi-media art served as one of the
primary methods deployed by the community in opposition to the Atlantic Yards – Barclays
Center development. Activists used artistic renderings of neighborhood life to instantiate
imaginations of the community before AYBC, as well as what it might be after the project is
completed. In what Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn calls ‘photo simulations’, renderings of the
neighborhood after the development show street life dwarfed by new high rise developments and
luxury apartments. In contrast with the photographs deployed in Forest City Ratner’s
commissioned Blight Study, DDDB photographed the buildings that would be taken by eminent
domain through a different lens. Rather than training their camera on garbage or crumbling
driveways, DDDB documented the communal life in the neighborhood, including long-time
residents chatting on stoops, well maintained homes, and politically active streets.

Figure 7 - Photograph of 812 Pacific Street (DDDB)
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Figure 8 - Photograph of 489, 491, and 495 Dean Street (DDDB)
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Figure 9 - Photo Compilation of 473, 485, 479, and 483 Dean Street (DDDB)
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Tidily kept homes and street life conjure notions of a healthy neighborhood. The
residents’ argument here is that the neighborhood is cannot be blighted given the utilization, the
sanitariness, and the upkeep shown. The logic underlying the photos lionizes aspects of property
ownership and neighborhood communality in ways that diminish the role of city, state, and
global financial politics in the making of the neighborhood. What is missed in the DDDB photo
essay is the narrative of how the neighborhood came to be targeted for neoliberal urban
redevelopment in the first place. Urban neighborhoods do not become ripe for urban
redevelopment through natural processes, but rather through socio-spatial and socio-legal
activities that produce cycles of disinvestment and reinvestment. Taking that context into
account, what the photos show is extraordinary resiliency in the face of long-term disinvestment.
DDDB presents the photos without this framing or history, maybe strategically. Ironically, those
visual signifiers of disinvestment are the very subject of the ESDC Blight Study. In the case of
the Blight Study they are similarly presented without context, but to a different end. The
community performs resiliency not only in the ongoing life at the street level, but in the capacity
and will to collectively imagine alternative futures for the neighborhood.
Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn further framed their own conception of the
neighborhood in contrast with a faceless development regime through protest art. The poster
‘Stop Atlantic Yards’ (Fig. 10) combines photography with computer art to convey an
understanding of scale in alignment with the project opponents’ conception of ideal urban
spaces. In the poster, a photograph of the Dean Playground, located on the block circumscribed
by Dean Street, Bergen Street, 6th Avenue and Carlton Avenue, is combined with computer
renderings of high rise towers in block rectangular shapes devoid of details. The photograph in
the foreground shows people utilizing the park, some playing basketball and others sitting around
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watching and socializing. The images of the buildings do not contain windows or any other
element that is suggestive of social life. The development renderings in the background tower
over the playground, drawing into contrast the literal vertical scale of the development with that
of the neighborhood at its feet.
Another protest poster, titled “Supersize Brooklyn” (Fig. 11), was used in DDDB’s
advocacy efforts. The poster poses the question “Supersize Brooklyn?” and answers in
stereotypical New York fashion: “FUHGEDDABOUDIT!”. In its center, renderings of the
development’s skyline as viewed from Park Slope are shown. A few local geographic signifiers
point to the size and shape of the project, which the poster describes as “proposed
overdevelopment”. On the far left is a rendering of the Williamsburg Savings Bank Tower, a
clock tower erected in 1929 that was at the time of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park proposal the
tallest building in Brooklyn. The skyline renderings show the clock tower dwarfed by the
Atlantic Yards’ luxury residential and commercial skyscrapers, signifying the death of Brooklyn
culture in the new mode of development.
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Figure 10 - "Stop Atlantic Yards" Poster (DDDB)

Figure 11 - "Supersize Brooklyn?" Poster (DDDB)
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In addition to multi-media art as a means to convey possible futures for the
neighborhood, the residents also participated in actively planning an alternative development.
The UNITY plan (The Center for Community Planning and Development 2007), presented as an
alternative to the Ratner plan, reflects this forward-thinking trend among the neighborhoods
residents. It also neatly frames a critique of the forces at play in the Atlantic Yards/Barclays
Center eminent domain taking, and is reflective of the entangled relationships and processes
defining the site. The document interweaves legal claims with narratives describing cyclical
investment and disinvestment, and ultimately proposes an alternative development model for the
railyards (but not the adjacent residential and commercial blocks). Broadly, the UNITY plan
considers three potential scenarios that might require an alternative vision for the area’s
development. First, it claims that due to legal proceedings or potential economic shifts, Forest
City Ratner may have no option but to delay or permanently halt their project. Second, that the
phased structure of FCR’s plan allows the developers to opt out of the remainder of the
development after completing the first phase (the basketball arena and four towers), which could
leave the railyards untouched and the surrounding blocks vacant. Third, that the FCR plan is
likely to take considerably longer than was originally intended, and that the UNITY plan could
be leveraged as a guide for any modifications made to the plan as time goes on (ibid, 5). In its
own terms, the UNITY plan is not framed as an alternative based on community demands, but as
a response to economic or legalistic pitfalls that might torpedo the Ratner plans completion,
leaving a void in the neighborhood. To its credit, the first two scenarios anticipated in the
UNITY plan came to be.
The UNITY plan was designed through a participatory planning process, where residents
and activists met with architects and planners to devise alternative and contingency development
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models should the Forest City Ratner plan fall through or be only partially completed.
Participants in the planning process identified eight principles to guide their design:
“connect Prospect Heights, Fort Greene and other neighborhoods; develop at a human
scale and density; promote diversity and vitality in urban design; create and preserve
affordable housing; reduce traffic, improve mass transit; create jobs for Brooklyn
residents; create truly usable and accessible public spaces; guarantee an open planning
process, with transparency and accountability”. (ibid, 3)
The UNITY plan designers deploy mechanisms of urban planning similar to those deployed by
FCR, but with different goals in mind.
In addition to the elements of urban design written into the UNITY plan, the residents’
proposed alternative was designed to circumvent the need for an eminent domain seizure in the
first place. This was achieved by shifting the site of the plan’s arena from privately-held
property, as it was laid out in the FCR plan, to property already owned by FCR on an adjacent
lot. In a press conference captured in the documentary Battle for Brooklyn, Parsons School of
Design professor Joel Towers explains that “should one shift this project so that the arena is no
longer located on private property but rather is located on the property owned already by Mr.
Ratner, it would be possible to eliminate the eminent domain problem associated with this
project” (Hawley, Suki and Galinsky, 2011). Towers is referring to the Atlantic Terminal mall,
also a Ratner development, which sits at the intersection of Atlantic and Flatbush avenues, in the
space carved out created by the opposite angle of the Barclays Center site.
Interestingly, the UNITY plan leverages notions of scale discursively in ways that align
more closely with the project opponents than the FCR project, despite the fact that both the
UNITY plan and FCR conduct work in the terms of urban planning and redevelopment. In its
self-descriptive section “Why UNITY?”, the planners write, “Seen from a distance, and through
the lenses of Forest City Ratner, the Vanderbilt Rail Yards look like a blighted area in downtown
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Brooklyn. In fact, the area is neither blighted nor in downtown Brooklyn” (The Center for
Community Planning and Development 2007, 9). Here, the UNITY plan designers deploy scale
in the form of proximity to/distance from the development site and neighborhood to make the
case for their authenticity and FCR’s foreignness. The way scale is deployed then is tied less to
the medium and more to the actors.
The UNITY plan was not the only example of the project’s opponents utilizing the terms
and mechanisms of urban planning and development in their resistance to the FCR plan. Based in
large part on the UNITY plan’s first iteration, residents convinced commercial developer Extell
to submit a competing bid for the Vanderbilt Yards development project, aiming to displace the
FCR bid by offering a higher valuation. A scene in the documentary Battle for Brooklyn captures
the moment when one of the lead resident actvists, Shabnam Merchant, gets off the phone with
representatives from Extell having successfully worked out the terms of the Extell bid (Hawley
and Galinsky 2011).
The documentary Battle for Brooklyn captures much of the turmoil surrounding the
Atlantic Yards development and the use of eminent domain to acquire land for it. While the
producers interview both resident opponents and representatives from Forest City Ratner, the
documentary is sympathetic to the residents’ cause. Captured in the documentary, Forest City
Ratner’s then-Executive Vice President Bruce Bender says
“Change is difficult. And if you look at society as a whole, you look at the city as a
whole, you look at the nation as a whole, and I can talk about New York. Rockefeller
Center, as an example. It’s a great place! I wasn’t around when it was I guess created but
I go there now. And you know something, it’s terrific. But I know, doing some research,
that people opposed it. Think about all the things, that if everybody said we should not
have, what would the city be about? What would this state be about? What would this
country be about?” (Hawley and Galinsky 2011, 35:50).
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Bender thinks of the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park development as “being able to have
something”. He sees the project footprint as terra nullius, a blank slate, and the residents
opposing the development as advocating against a vacuum being filled. The residents, through
their organizing, opposition, and very presence, put forth an alternative imagination of what
exists and what the project footprint could be.
Through their efforts, the residents opposed to the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park plan
produced artifacts across a variety of media that capture their alternative vision for how the
neighborhood can and should be developed. In contrast with the FCR’s imagination of the
community, resident activists depict a lively community that ought to be fostered rather than an
underutilized area that ought to be replaced. Efforts by resident opponents to the FCR plan
through legal action and community organizing, combined with a shifting economic backdrop,
effectively impacted the FCR plan. In doing so, activists frequently deployed traditional notions
of hierarchical scale as a discursive strategy. The actual impacts on the development project,
however, suggest that a hierarchical scalar framework does not sufficiently explain the
relationships between different actors and space. The current state of the project site which has
been transformed over years by different visions of the neighborhood, through eminent domain
proceedings and activism, demands a different geographic intervention. In the next chapter I will
explore how a fusion of critical legal and feminist geographies help make sense of the project
site and how it came to be.
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VII: Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park as a Nomosphere
The competing representations of the site of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park development
project by its developers and opponents constitute opposing sides of a discursive practice.
Through this practice, each side has leveraged differing conceptions of idealized urban life, and
has situated their arguments in normative conceptions of scale. The site of the development has
always been materially produced through cycles of investment and disinvestment, and the
movement of people and capital, and in many ways those cycles were informed by legal practice.
The particular convergence of imaginaries taking place around the Atlantic Yards project makes
the relationship between spatiality and legality more legible, as those competing representations
explicitly leveraged a judicial system and an administrative system in the struggle over who has
the right to define the landscape. One central question that legal geographers frequently ask is
“where is the law?” (Delaney, Ford and Blomley, 2001). Nested within that question are
challenges to the nature of law, its givenness, and the relationship between law and space. Legal
practice simply cannot exist without spaces for it to act in and on. In this sense, the site of the
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project offers a valuable case study into the ways in which spatial
practice informs the legal, and legal practice informs the spatial.
In his essay “Landscapes of Property”, Nicholas Blomley describes the local activism
opposing a 1994 downtown development project in Vancouver, Canada, with dynamics eerily
similar to those at play in the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project. In the Vancouver case, local
activists leverage notions of community and local agency to oppose a development project they
characterize as driven by ‘global’ capital, and which would usher in mass displacement of
longtime residents (2001). Blomley argues that “positive portrayals of community life and its
members can often entail a form of ‘strategic essentialism,’ a savvy choice” (ibid, 127). Here he
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describes the decision to emphasize certain elements of public life as part of the discursive
practice wrapped up in struggles over space. In Brooklyn, hte “savvy choice” is mirrored in the
residents’ opposition to the Atlantic Yards project, where those signifiers of belonging were
deployed not only in public debate, but in the courthouse as well. Over time and as the project
development timeline wore on, the nature of the project opponents’ legal challenges shifted from
claiming grievances under constitutional law towards obfuscating the timely completion of the
project through administrative practice. It is possible that this second category had the greatest
bearing on the actual built space in Brooklyn today.
The idea that the mutual constitution of law and space plays a heavy hand in the creation
of social reality is fairly obvious. The challenge that critical legal geography issues is to interpret
events or sites in ways that do not reify normative understandings of space (e.g., hierarchical
scale) and the law (e.g., the givenness of authority) (Delaney 2010). David Delaney describes
how interpreting phenomena as either spatial or legal leads to elevating certain features over
others. He further argues that “conventional ways of understanding either the legal or the spatial
may have the effect of stabilizing conventional ways of understanding and assessing the other”
(ibid, 7). Considering how the opponents to the Atlantic Yards plan discursively deployed scale
to position themselves as local and authentic and the developers as global and sterile, as
described in the preceding chapter, offers a good glimpse into the intertwined conventional
understandings of both space and law.
Delaney offers the concept of the ‘nomosphere’ as an intervention that escapes the
reifying effects of normative analysis. He defines the nomosphere as “the cultural-material
environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization of “the legal”, and the legal
signification of the “socio-spatial”, and the practical, performative engagements through which
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such constitutive moments happen and unfold (2004, 851). The nomosphere, in other words, is a
material and social reality that comes into being through the co-constitution of law and space,
and the performance of both. In the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project, the
nomosphere might reflect the current social reality, or what exists at the site today. It came to be
through the performance and implementation of the legal and the spatial.
While the coalition of residents and commercial tenants opposing the Atlantic
Yards/Pacific Park project did not bring the skirmish into a courthouse until 2006 with the
beginning of the case Goldstein v. Pataki, legal and spatial performativity began much earlier.
One could begin in the meetings leading up to the project’s 2003 announcement, where Forest
City Ratner would have strategized around the development, planning the launch and thinking
through the mechanisms that would ensure its success. One could go further back, and situate the
project within a longer trajectory of urban (re)development in Brooklyn, its oppositions, and the
related struggles over gentrification, displacement, and property values across the borough. For
the purposes of this chapter, I will describe legal and spatial performativity as it gave rise to the
project site as a nomosphere beginning with the project’s legal challenges in federal and state
courts, and moving forward through the practice of administrative law.
In the case Goldstein v. Pataki, first brought before the Eastern District of New York (a
Federal District Court), the legal challenge held broad terms. The plaintiffs focused on three
constitutional violations. First, a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
second, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and third, a
violation of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F.
Supp. 2d 254, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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The fifth amendment claim contends that the means with which eminent domain was
deployed (or was intended to be deployed) in the project’s development violated the precedent
set out in Kelo v New London (545 U.S. 469, 2005). As discussed in earlier, Kelo was a landmark
case in that it signified a shift in the eminent domain paradigm wherein economic development
was classified as a public benefit sufficient to justify the taking of private property through
public seizure. Further, in Kelo, the private property taken was then provided to another private
developer. While to many this precedent might signify an uphill battle on fifth amendment
grounds, Matthew Brinckerhoff – the council representing the plaintiffs – relied on some of the
more nuanced details in the Kelo decision to support their claims.
The decision in Kelo allowed for a taking, but stipulated that there must be a planning
process involved. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the decision noted that “the
respondents reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group
of applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand” (Kelo v. New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (Kennedy A. concurring)). In the Atlantic Yards case, the plaintiffs argued
that the usage of a single developer and refusal of the ESDC to consider other bids constituted a
clear departure from the stipulations set forth in Kelo. The Atlantic Yards suit moved many of
the arguments being made locally, through political practice, discourse and organizing, into the
legal arena. In particular, that the costs of the project were undisclosed, that the elimination of
blight was not listed as a goal in the 2003 project unveiling, and that the affordable housing and
jobs benefits were overstated. That the lawsuit first came in federal court instead of state court
was also a strategic decision with spatial considerations. Plaintiffs worried that the state court
system would be insufficiently insulated from local politics, and therefore may be hostile.
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The defendants in the case (Forest City Ratner, the Empire State Development
Corporation, then-Mayor Pataki, and associates) moved to have the case dismissed. They argued
that permitting federal litigation would thwart the policies set forth in New York’s Eminent
Domain Procedural Law (EDPL) intended to promote efficiency and litigation (Goldstein v.
Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). In his decision, Judge Garaufis states that his
concern “is with the EDPL’s coherence, not with any of its other virtues, such as reducing
litigation and promoting efficiency”, but that he will not consider whether the project constitutes
a public use (ibid 274).
Further in Judge Garaufis decision, he approaches scale as he describes local political
processes in contradiction with legal processes. Regarding those differences, e writes,
“Defendants seem to conflate (1) the political process of selecting public projects and sites for
condemnation and (2) the legal process of determining whether a particular project serves a
‘public use’ under the United States Constitution” (ibid 274). Framed alongside the case for a
nomospheric understanding of phenomena, the argument being made in Judge Garaufis decision
relies on two conventional spatial imaginaries. First, that political processes are situated within a
scalar hierarchy, and in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project those processes are
hyper-local. The second is that legal practice exists outside of any scalar analysis. While the
second assertion might on the surface level reflect some of the underpinnings of a flat ontology
analysis, the decision doesn’t remove federal law and legal practice from hierarchical scale
alone, but from spatiality in its entirety. He continues,
“But this court is not being asked to evaluate the political questions underlying the Project. This
case simply does not require the court to consider whether the Project is a good idea or whether it
can be achieved only by taking Plaintiffs’ properties as opposed to other properties or no
properties at all. Instead, the issue before the court is whether the taking of Plaintiffs’ properties
is rationally related to a conceivable public use, as required by the United States Constitution”
(ibid 274).
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To that end, the onus is put on the plaintiffs to prove that the takings at issue violate the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, an exceedingly high bar given the latitude allowed in
defining public use.
Here, too, issues of spatiality come into play in Judge Garaufis’ decision. The coalition of
homeowners and commercial property owners that brought the suit argued that their individual
buildings were not blighted, no matter the condition of the broader neighborhood. These
arguments were supported by some of the photographs and multimedia work described in
Chapter Six, and which were entered into evidence in Goldstein v. Pataki. The Judge, however,
applied a ruling standard from the 1954 case Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26), claiming property
that itself may be innocuous may be taken for redevelopment “if the redevelopment is intended
to cure and prevent reversion to blight in some larger area that includes the property” (Goldstein
v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp 2d 254, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). At play in the legal analysis are the
conventional spatial concepts of boundaries and containment.
On June 6th, 2007, Judge Garaufis granted the defendant’s request for dismissal. He
writes, “Because Plaintiffs concede that the project will create large quantities of housing and
office space, as well as a sports arena, in an area that is mostly blighted, Plaintiffs’ allegations, if
proven, would not permit a reasonable juror to conclude that the “sole purpose” of the project is
to confer a private benefit” (ibid 290). The plaintiffs appealed Judge Garaufis dismissal and in
October 2007 appeared before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which in 2008 issued a
decision upholding the Eastern District court’s dismissal (Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F. 3d 50 (2nd
Cir. 2008)). Finally, the plaintiff’s attempted to elevate the decision to the United States Supreme
Court, which denied to hear the case, ending the suit but not extinguishing a broader legal
strategy that the residents would bring.
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While Goldstien v. Pataki was moving through the federal court system, the residents
opposed to the Atlantic Yards/Barclays Center project also entered a number of suits in the New
York state court system attacking the project on various fronts. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn
shifted its strategy to deploy procedural law, forcing roadblocks at the various steps in the
development process including environmental review, the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure.
At the same time, DDDB moved to repeat its eminent domain complaint in the New York court
system.
The New York State Court of Appeals is unique in that the court allows video recording
of oral arguments within its chambers. As of this writing, the owner of Freddy’s, the bar and
commercial tenant in the lawsuit, maintains the video recording of the Goldstein v. New York
Urban Development Corporation (921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)) oral arguments on its
YouTube account. In oral arguments, the plaintiffs’ counsel Matthew Brinckerhoff focuses on
the interpretation of economic benefits as a public use. Brinckerhoff argues against the idea of
sub-maximal economic utilization as an indicator of blight as laid out in the ESDC Blight Study.
Focusing on the geography of the site, a Judge asks what he frames as a “favorable”
question to Brinckerhoff. The judge delineates the development site into ‘north’ and ‘south’
sections, with the north containing the railyards and largely commercial zones, and the south
containing the residential areas where many of the plaintiffs reside. He says,
“… the blight study certainly says that the project site as a whole is characterized by
blight. I got the impression in reading it that what they’re really saying is that the
northern part is blighted and the southern part has a few problems but when you add it all
up together it’s blighted. That’s different than saying the southern part is blighted. This is
obviously, from your perspective, a friendly question … but do you see it the same way I
do?” (Freddy’s Brooklyn Roundhouse Bar, 2009, 12:05)
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In his response, however, Brinckerhoff elects to not comment on the geographic distinction and
instead refocuses on whether or not economic utilization constitutes blight in the first place.
Across multiple lawsuits and court systems, questions touching on the spatiality of the
development project consistently reified conventional norms about scalar hierarchy, legal nonspatiality, and the relationship between the two. Brinckerhoff deflecting the question on
spatiality in order to discuss the definition of blight and economic utilization constitutes a
discursive and strategic decision based on his notions of how the legal system conceives of space
and scale. While the judge’s question was posed as “friendly”, previous litigation and outcomes
in related cases suggest that Brinckerhoff’s attempt to reorient the conversation towards nonspatiality was strategic and maybe the best tactic in the moment. Taken outside the frame of
traditional legal analysis, almost every issue at question in the project’s multiple eminent domain
cases are spatial in that they refer to territory, containment, and claims to space that are both
cultural and material. Repeatedly over the course of the eminent domain trials, however, both in
federal and state systems, courts adhered to and reproduced a logic of non-spatiality.
Nomosphericity points to how through both normative spatial and legal practice, and despite the
courts’ insistence on non-spatial logic, an entirely novel space came to be.
Scalar imaginations at play in the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park site are not limited to the
aesthetic products of the development’s proponents, nor of its opponents (the textual artifacts
described in Chapters Five and Six, respectively). Those imaginations are present in and are
seemingly coproduced with the legal struggles over the project. Outside of the failed federal
challenge to the eminent domain taking, and the failed state challenge in the New York Court of
Appeals, Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn and other stakeholders contested the development
through local administrative law. The law firm Young Sommer, representing DDDB, filed
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comments in response to the project’s 2009 Modified General Project Plan (MGPP). The MGPP
changed to some extent the original project plan, shifting development timelines and
enumerating the civic benefits to the arena plan from the developers’ perspective. The 2009
MGPP contends that despite the changes to the original plan, the project should not repeat an
analysis mandated under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (which had been
conducted after the initial plan was submitted), nor should it repeat an analysis determining its
Land Use Improvement Project and Civic Project statuses (UDC d/b/a ESDC 2009). Young
Sommers, representing DDDB, contests both of these claims.
The Young Sommers comments argue that the changes in the development project’s plan
undermine the originally stated public benefit of the development across two primary vectors.
The first is that the MGPP fails to take into account the renegotiated contract between the
developers and the Metropolitan Transit Authority resulting in flawed calculations of the
project’s economic benefit (Young Sommers LLC, 2). The second is that the non-financial case
for public benefit – namely the urban design improvements – were negated when famed architect
Frank Gehry withdrew from the planning and design process (ibid, 5). Smaller impediments to
the development process such as the challenge to the MGPP had considerable impacts on the
trajectory of the development. While the developers consistently won out in these procedural and
administrative challenges, responding to the challenges drew on staff time and capacity resulting
in delayed project timelines and changed plans, and the built environment changed with it.
In parallel with the developers promoting the project and the residents’ opposing it in the
public view, the terms of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park development project were negotiated,
limited, and changed through legal challenges. Understanding the project, both how it was
imagined and how it has so far come to be, means thinking about the project in terms of its social
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reality. Nomosphericity in combination with feminist geographic critiques of scalar hierarchy
help explain the relationship between the site as either side imagined it and the site that exists
today. Both the project’s proponents and opponents put forth imaginaries of the development,
and neither map directly on to the social reality, or the material results of ongoing contention. In
a variety of ways, social reality is produced through the mutual co-production of the legal and
the spatial. The legal battles over the Atlantic Yards/Barclays Center development only drive that
point home.
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VIII: Conclusion
Where is the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center project now? The stadium is built and has
been occupied for almost a decade. The Brooklyn Nets still call it home, and the National
Hockey League’s Islanders are planning a move to Brooklyn. Several of the commercial and
residential towers have been built, though not all of them are standing or are currently slated for
construction. Vanderbilt Yards still sits mostly untouched, like an open wound where the
neighborhoods converge. The renovated train yard, arguably the most tangible and least
debatable public-use aspect of the development, has languished. In October 2019, the Greenland
Group (the projects current owners9) announced that work on the railyard would begin in 2020
(Cuozzo 2019). As of November 2020, plans for the railyard platform and tower design had not
been approved (Oder 2020). The most recent plans place the majority of the project’s affordable
housing units in four of the six towers slated to be built atop the railyard, and city officials are
dubious that the affordable housing component of the development will meet its 2025 deadline
(Aponte and Smith 2019). Stepping beyond the original project’s footprint, the mode of
development looks very much the same – massive new high-rise towers, mostly of luxury
condominiums have gone up at rapid pace. One houses an Apple Store that looks like a space
ship.
Stepping further back from the project footprint, the struggle over the Pacific Park project
has had impacts across the city’s landscape. In 2009, a few miles from the Atlantic Yards site,
another eminent domain taking was challenged in court. The Columbia University Educational

9

In December 2013, Forest City Enterprises reported a $242 million impairment of its Atlantic
Yards investment. The Greenland Corporation – a majority Chinese government-owned
development group- bought its share for $200 million, a considerable discount.
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Mixed Use Development Land Use Improvement and Civic Project was supported by the New
York State Urban Development Corporation in its bid to use eminent domain to acquire property
for an expansion of the private university’s campus. In Kaur v. New York State Development
Corp. (933 NE 2d 721, (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)), the New York Appellate Court found in favor of
the local property owners, denying the use of eminent domain. The majority opinion in Kaur
applied logic laid out Goldstein v. Pataki (DeWitt 2010).
In a similar regime of development, in September 2017, Amazon issued a Request For
Proposals (RFP) asking municipalities to submit bids to a site selection process for its second
corporate headquarters, dubbed HQ2. Cities across the country committed massive resources
towards developing bids to bring Amazon in, with massive tax benefits packages being a
common thread across them. Ultimately Amazon announced two winners – Washington, D.C.,
and New York City. The two cities offered incentive packages amounting to a combined $5.5
billion ($3 billion from New York City and $2.5 billion from Washington, D.C.), exceeding the
$5 billion that Amazon itself committed to invest (Bauerlein, Vielkind, and McKinnnon 2018).
In New York, local lawmakers, activists, and community organizers formed a fierce coalition
against the development, centering the massive financial giveaway as unwarranted for Amazon’s
private development, and referencing similar development projects including Atlantic
Yard/Pacific Park. On Valentines Day 2019, Amazon withdrew from its plan to build a second
headquarters in New York City (Goodman 2019). The struggle over the Atlantic Yards project
fits into a lineage of how New Yorkers conceive of development and its values. The relationship
between policy, legality, and spatiality, was made more legible through the resistance to the
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project.
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This thesis’ second chapter laid out the theoretical framework that guided the ensuing
analysis, focusing largely on the interplay between critical legal geography and new frameworks
of scale arising from feminist geography. Flat ontology and nomosphericity were given
particular attention, in that both theoretical models take into account the spatial and legal
positionality of different actors while drawing attention to how material reality often challenges
conventional notions of scale, space, and the law.
In the third chapter I reviewed eminent domain as a legal doctrine, providing a backdrop
against which the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park struggles can be situated. Eminent domain’s
evolutions, and the expanding definition of “public use” or “public benefit” played out in the
project’s developers’ and opponents’ respective legal and social strategies. Legal recourse
offered through eminent domain provided a platform from which the project’s opponents could
exercise power and simultaneously perform spatiality and legality.
In the fourth chapter I described the project as an historically embedded site. The
entangled development regimes, planning processes and claims to space, both in Brooklyn at
large and at the project site specifically, inform the debate around the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park
development project. Understanding the site’s lineage and how the project came to be situates
the debates around the project and the site as it exists today.
The fifth chapter described the project developers’ approach to development. It examined
legal and spatial artifacts that contributed to their claim to space. Particular focus was given to
the Empire State Development Corporation Blight Study, which used maps, spatial technology
and analysis to build both the legal and economic case for the development project. In the sixth
chapter I analyzed textual artifacts produced by the project’s opponents as they exercised social
and legal power to fight and delay the Atlantic Yards development. Of key importance in these
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documents were the ways in which both the developers and opponents produce scalar and spatial
positionalities intended to concretize their claims to space.
The seventh chapter examined the relationship between the legal and the spatial as
challenges to the use of eminent domain flowed through federal and state court systems. A
critical legal geographic framework was used to deconstruct the legal documents and decisions,
which points to how in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park conflict conventional spatial
positions served to normalize conventional legal frameworks, and vice versa.
The eminent domain cases that initially challenged the development ended, but a slew of
smaller challenges on other grounds cropped up in the intervening years. The persistence of both
these legal interventions against the development and their outcomes underscores the role of
legal practice in placemaking. The massive rift between the project’s original plan and timeline
and the current state of affairs demonstrates how legal practice and spatial practice are
intertwined, and how material reality comes into being through the negotiation of both. Neither
the spatial and scalar imaginations of the developers nor those of the project’s opponents have
come to be in their entirety. The project’s opponents willingly framed themselves as hyper-local,
situated at a finer-grained scale below city and state politics, and global capital. Their impact on
the actual built space confounds the very hierarchical imagination that they adopted, suggesting a
flat topology.
Competing imaginations, deployed discursively in the claim to space, were performed
through both spatial and legal practice. The resulting site – the flat nomosphere that coexists on
the project footprint - illuminates the cracks in normative conceptions of scale and law. Eminent
domain as a doctrine is rife with conflict and contradictions. The judiciary’s unwillingness to
clearly delineate or rule on what constitutes a ‘public benefit’ has given rise to an area of legal
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practice inherently wrapped up in claims to space. All the while, this legal practice serves to
situate the spatial within the legal, or to erase space and scale from its considerations. The legal
battles over the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project that played out in federal and state courts
demonstrate this tendency in the law.
The constantly evolving nature of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project makes it a rich
subject for analysis, and a challenging one. The project plans have changed countless times. All
the while, the original attributes that were meant to constitute a public use or benefit have been
for the most part unrealized. Norman Oder, whose watchdog blog Atlantic Yards / Pacific Park
Report began tracking the project and its conflicts in 2008, continues to follow and report on the
project. While the legal and social resistance to the project impacted the ways in which the site as
it stands today came to be, it is hard to decipher exactly what actions had which effects. The
2008 global recession surely impacted the development timeline, as did the changing ownership
of the project. While specific outcomes might not be clearly attributable to the residents that
formed Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn and opposed the project, the legal action, activism, and
textual artifacts produced along the way illuminate the relationship between law and space.
Despite its position at the intersection of space and law, public seizure through eminent
domain has been given little regard by geographers. Eminent domain offers a valuable
intervention to analyze the ways in which spatiality and legality give way to one another.
Stepping away from the common framing of eminent domain as a legal or political power and reconceptualizing eminent domain as a socio-legal process characterized by its tendency to
transcend and transmute scalar imaginaries brings into focus and problematize the complex
operations of scale. Situating eminent domain within critical legal and feminist geographic
frameworks brings disparate sub-disciplines into conversation with one another, and may open
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up further avenues for analysis. As evidenced in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park
project, the analyses provided by re-conceptualizing eminent domain provides new and valuable
explanations for how places become the way that they are.
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